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This thesis explores how LGBT marriage activists and lawyers have employed a racial 
interpretation of due process and equal protection in recent same-sex marriage litigation. Special 
attention is paid to the Supreme Court’s opinion in Loving v. Virginia, the landmark case that 
declared anti-miscegenation laws unconstitutional. By exploring the use of racial precedent in 
same-sex marriage litigation and its treatment in state court cases, this thesis critiques the racial 
interpretation of due process and equal protection that became the basis for LGBT marriage 
briefs and litigation, and attempts to answer the question of whether a racial interpretation of due 
process and equal protection is an appropriate model for same-sex marriage litigation both 
constitutionally and strategically. The existing scholarly literature fails to explore how this issue 
has been treated in case briefs, which are very important elements in any legal proceeding. I will 
argue that through an analysis of recent state court briefs in Massachusetts and Connecticut, 
Loving acts as logical precedent for the legalization of same-sex marriage. I also find, more 
significantly, that although this racial interpretation of due process and equal protection 
represented by Loving can be seen as an appropriate model for same-sex marriage litigation 
constitutionally, questions remain about its strategic effectiveness, as LGBT lawyers have moved 
away from race in some arguments in these briefs. Indeed, a racial interpretation of Due Process 
and Equal Protection doctrine imposes certain limits on same-sex marriage litigation, of which 
we are warned by some Critical Race theorists, Latino Critical Legal theorists, and other 
scholars. In order to fully incorporate a discussion of race into the argument for legalizing same-



















The time may come, far in the future, when contracts and arrangements between persons of the 
same sex who abide together will be recognized and enforced under state law. When that time 
comes, property rights and perhaps even mutual obligations of support may well be held to flow 
from such relationships. But in my opinion, even such a substantial change in the prevailing 
mores would not reach the point where such relationships would be characterized as 
"marriages". At most, they would become personal relationships having some, but not all, of the 
legal attributes of marriage. And even when and if that day arrives, two persons of the same sex, 
like those before the Court today, will not be thought of as being "spouses" to each other within 
the meaning of the immigration laws. For that result to obtain, an affirmative enactment of 


























                                                 






 Few issues have created more passion and division among the American public than the 
current debate surrounding the legalization of same-sex marriage. Growing out of the gay rights 
movement, the movement to legalize same-sex marriage has gained popularity over the past 
decade as the perceived chief goal of the gay rights movement. This movement has inspired 
hundreds of rallies around the country, including large marches in Washington,2 as well as 
intense debate among many Americans. 
 This debate has enormous political, legal, and social implications within the United 
States; the debate has called into question the citizenship of gay and lesbian individuals, and 
whether they can be considered full members of society if not eligible for all the benefits of 
marriage provided to others.3 These questions of citizenship bring up debates over equality and 
the equal rights provisions of the U.S. and state constitutions. Do opposite-sex marriage laws 
violate constitutional equal protection guarantees by prohibiting same-sex couples from 
marrying? Indeed, these political, legal, and social implications became more notable after the 
Massachusetts Supreme Court decision in 2003 that declared same-sex marriage legal in that 
state. The issue of same-sex marriage was extremely salient in the 2004 presidential election; 
some scholars assert that the proposed constitutional amendments to ban same-sex marriage on 
the ballot in several states may have cost the election for Democratic candidate Senator John 
                                                 
2 See Roehr, Bob. "National Equality March Draws 100,000 to DC. (cover story)." Bay Area Reporter, October 15, 
2009: 1, 12. The article reports that about 100,000 LGBT people and their supporters joined the National Equality 
March on October 11, 2009 in District of Columbia (DC) that calls for action to correct the second-class citizenship 
of gays. 
3 See Concannon, Liam. "Citizenship, Sexual identity and social exclusion: Exploring issues in British and 
American social policy." International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy 28, no. 9-10 (2008): 326-339.; Edgar, 
Gemma. "Engaging with the State: Citizenship, Injustice, and the Problem with Queer." Gay and Lesbian Issues and 
Equality Review 4, no. 3 (December 2008): 176-187. 
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Kerry by turning out the Christian right in greater numbers.4 Moreover, recent state court 
decisions on the legality of same-sex marriage have great effects on the legal rights and benefits 
of those in same-sex relationships as couples, as well as on the social acceptance of their 
relationships. Married couples are entitled to many legal benefits like tax deductions and easier 
access to medical coverage for both individuals. Debates over civil partnerships and civil unions 
have focused on whether these civil unions go far enough in extending these legal benefits to 
same-sex couples, and whether they encourage the same level of social acceptance of same-sex 
unions as marriages have.5 
 The same-sex marriage and gay rights debates can be viewed as one strand of the larger 
civil rights movement in America. The civil rights movement has involved battles of equality 
and acceptance both legally—through debates of due process and equal protection—and socially 
for many historically disadvantaged groups. These groups have been disadvantaged based on 
their race, religion, national origin, gender, and sexual orientation, to name a few, and have 
employed due process and equal protection arguments in their struggles for relief and redress. 
The differing factors causing the disadvantages of these groups invite comparisons between these 
groups in their civil rights experience. In this thesis, I focus on the relationship between race and 
sexual orientation in the context of the civil rights movement, specifically the impact of race on 
the same-sex marriage debates that have grown out of the gay rights movement. 
                                                 
4 See Lewis, Gregory B. "Same-Sex Marriage and the 2004 Presidential Election." PS: Political Science and Politics 
(American Political Science Association) 38, no. 2 (April 2005): 195-199.; Campbell, David E., and J. Quin 
Monson. "The Religion Card: Gay Marriage and the 2004 Presidential Election." Public Opinion Quarterly 72, no. 3 
(Fall 2008): 399-419. 
 
5 See Brandzel, Amy L. "Queering Citizenship? Same-Sex Marriage and the State." GLQ: A Journal of Lesbian and 
Gay Studies 11, no. 2 (2005): 171-204.; Edgar, Gemma. "Engaging with the State: Citizenship, Injustice, and the 
Problem with Queer." Gay and Lesbian Issues and Equality Review 4, no. 3 (December 2008): 176-187.; Shainker, 
Andrew J. "Civil Partnerships Vs. Full Marriage Rights." Echo Magazine, February 19, 2009: 28. 
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 This thesis explores how Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender (LGBT) marriage 
activists and lawyers, specifically the organization Gay and Lesbian Advocates and Defenders 
(GLAD), have employed the Supreme Court’s opinion in Loving v. Virginia,6 the landmark case 
that declared anti-miscegenation laws unconstitutional, in recent same-sex marriage litigation. 
By exploring the use of a race-based interpretation of the Due Process and Equal Protection 
Clauses in same-sex marriage case briefs, this thesis critiques the racial interpretation of due 
process and equal protection as applied to same-sex marriage litigation and attempts to answer 
the question of whether Loving, the legalization of interracial marriage, is an appropriate model 
for same-sex marriage litigation both constitutionally and strategically. The existing scholarship 
fails to look at case briefs and instead relies on court opinions and the similarity of arguments 
between racial and same-sex marriage debates. Thus, I will argue that through an analysis of the 
appellant briefs submitted in two recent state court opinions, a racial interpretation of due 
process and equal protection can act as precedent for the legalization of same-sex marriage. 
More importantly, however, I find that although a racial case like Loving can be seen as an 
appropriate model for same-sex marriage litigation logically and constitutionally, questions 
remain about its strategic effectiveness. I suggest that as evidenced by these briefs, same-sex 
marriage legal activists should take care in how they approach race in their arguments. Activists 
have tried to stay away from race in their arguments, but in particular instances still need to scale 
back their racial interpretation of due process and equal protection doctrine as applied to same-
sex marriage litigation. The danger of using this racial interpretation of Fourteenth Amendment 
doctrine is inherent in the Black/White binary model of civil rights discourse, which argues that 
racial minorities, specifically blacks, represent the model minority group and that all other 
                                                 




minority groups must compare their experience of oppression to that of blacks to be eligible for 
certain civil rights.7 
 Chapter I explores the history behind the gay rights movement and the same-sex marriage 
debates and their relation to miscegenation. The context of this project is provided in a 
discussion of the current state of same-sex marriage in the United States. Chapter II details the 
scholarly literature on this topic, explains the importance of examining case briefs, and provides 
an overview of the project methodology. Chapters III and IV examine the appellant briefs 
submitted in two recent state court opinions dealing with same-sex marriage, Goodridge v. 
Department of Public Health
8 and Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health,9 respectively. 
These chapters provide an analysis of the racial arguments included in the briefs, through the 
plaintiffs’ claims of Due Process, Equal Protection, and their treatment of the definitional 
argument that consumes the same-sex marriage debate. Chapter V attempts to summarize and 
highlight my findings by tying together the briefs submitted in both cases. I find a sort of 
evolution in how the plaintiffs in the two cases treat the potential limitations on the use of Loving 
as precedent for same-sex marriage litigation, and suggest that their use of a racial interpretation 
of due process and equal protection in both cases may reflect a growing recognition of the 
dangers imposed by the black/white binary model of race relations. I find that my conclusions 
                                                 
7 For an overview of the black/white binary, see Perea, Juan F. "The Black/White Binary Paradigm of Race: The 
Normal Science of American Racial Thought." California Law Review 85, no. 5 (October 1997): 1213.; Moran, 
Rachel F. "Neither Black Nor White." Harvard Latino Law Review 2, Fall 1997: 61-99.; Delgado, Richard, and Jean 
Stefancic. Critical Race Theory: An Introduction. New York: New York University Press, 2001.; Kim, Janine 
Young. "Are Asians Black: The Asian-American Civil Rights Agenda and the Contemporary Significance of the 
Black/White Paradigm." Yale Law Journal 108 (1998-1999): 2385.; Alcoff, Linda Martin. "Latino/As, Asian 
Americans, and the Black-White Binary." The Journal of Ethics 7, no. 1 (2003): 5-27. For a discussion of the 
dangers imposed by the binary on same-sex marriage litigation, see Hutchinson, Darren Leonard. "Out Yet Unseen: 
A Racial Critique of Gay and Lesbian Legal Theory and Political Discourse." Connecticut Law Review 29, Winter 
1997: 561.; Schacter, Jane S. "The Gay Civil Rights Debate in the States: Decoding the Discourse of Equivalents." 
Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review 29 (Summer 1994): 283.; Kendell, Kate. "Race, Same-Sex 
Marriage, and White Privilege: The Problem with Civil Rights Analogies." Yale Journal of Law and Feminism 17, 
2005: 133-137. 
8 440 Mass. 309 (2003) 
9 289 Conn. 135 (2008) 
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represent the scholarship of Darren Hutchinson and Jane Schacter, who have argued for an 
approach to same-sex marriage litigation that does not force a comparison of LGBT and African-
American oppression.10 I also suggest that the plaintiffs look to the scholarship of Professor 
William Eskridge11 and employ his historical approach to combating certain arguments against 
same-sex marriage. I conclude by suggesting possibilities for further research. 
  
                                                 
10 See Hutchinson, Darren Leonard. "Out Yet Unseen: A Racial Critique of Gay and Lesbian Legal Theory and 
Political Discourse." Connecticut Law Review 29, Winter 1997: 561.; Schacter, Jane S. "The Gay Civil Rights 
Debate in the States: Decoding the Discourse of Equivalents." Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review 29 
(Summer 1994): 283. 
11 William Eskridge is Professor of Law at Yale Law School. For his examination of same-sex unions throughout 




I. HISTORY AND CONTEXT 
 
Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow, malay and red, and he placed them on separate continents. 
And but for the interference with his arrangement there would be no cause for such marriages. The fact that he 
separated the races shows that he did not intend for the races to mix.
12 
 
There is patently no legitimate overriding purpose independent of invidious racial discrimination which justifies this 
classification…There can be no doubt that restricting the freedom to marry solely because of racial classifications 
violates the central meaning of the Equal Protection Clause… These statutes also deprive the Lovings of liberty 





 When exploring any research question, a thorough understanding of the historical debates 
surrounding the research topic is essential in order to provide background and frame the current 
debate in an historical context. This chapter explores the historical foundations that led to the use 
of equal protection and due process claims in same-sex marriage litigation. First, I will document 
the history of miscegenation laws in the United States. I will then cover the history of the Gay 
Rights Movement in the United States, including early same-sex marriage litigation and court 
decisions. In the final section, I will provide context for this project by discussing more recent 
same-sex marriage litigation and where the same-sex marriage debate stands today. This chapter 
provides an overview of the history of how the Equal Protection Clause and Due Process clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment have been used in court opinions dealing with interracial marriage 
and same-sex marriage, and provides context for my investigation into the use of a racial 
interpretation of these clauses in recent same-sex marriage litigation. I find that the equal 
protection and due process arguments employed in same-sex marriage litigation emerged from 
miscegenation arguments, and that the emergence of these arguments from a racial history  
framed current debates over the appropriateness of the use of race in same-sex marriage 
litigation. 
                                                 
12 Virginia Trial Judge Leon Bazile, as quoted by the Supreme Court in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 3 







This section addresses the history of interracial marriage in the United States, including 
an overview of court decisions that eventually made anti-miscegenation laws unconstitutional. 
These court decisions concerning interracial marriage included equal protection and due process 
arguments that then emerged in court decisions concerning same-sex marriage later in the 20th 
century. The history of miscegenation law helps to frame the current debate over same-sex 
marriage by providing a historical foundation of the central arguments surrounding the same-sex 
marriage debate and by showing how these arguments emerged from racial debates. 
Many states in the United States had legal restrictions on interracial marriage in the 18th, 
19th, and early 20th century. In 1776, seven out of the 13 original colonies that had declared their 
independence had laws barring interracial marriage. These early laws were often defended with 
racist interpretations of the bible.14 Northern states gradually abolished slavery after America’s 
independence, but anti-miscegenation laws were still enforced in many of these states. As the 
United States expanded westward, all new slave states as well as some new free states enacted 
laws banning interracial marriage. Some southern states temporarily repealed or left unenforced 
their anti-miscegenation laws during the Reconstruction era, but these laws were reenacted and 
enforced once again along with Jim Crow laws after white conservative Democrats took power 
after Reconstruction. Several northern and western states permanently repealed their anti-
miscegenation laws during the 19th century.15 
                                                 
14 The story of Noah’s curse on his son Ham became a biblical justification for American slavery and segregation, as 
Ham came to be known as the ancestor of black Africans. See Haynes, Stephen R. Noah's Curse: The Biblical 
Justification of American Slavery. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002. 
15 For data showing the dates that anti-miscegenation laws were enacted and repealed for each state as well as the 
specific text and statute titles of these laws, see: Loving Day. Legal Map: Accessible Version. 2009. 




Three federal constitutional amendments to ban interracial marriage throughout the 
country were introduced in Congress; none were ever enacted. In 1871, Representative Andrew 
King of Missouri proposed an amendment because he feared the fourteenth amendment banning 
slavery would eventually be extended to ban interracial marriage. In December of 1912, 
Representative Seaborn Roddenbury of Georgia introduced a similar amendment. Roddenbury’s 
amendment was more severe, however, as it included the “one-drop rule,” which meant that 
anyone with any trace of African blood was barred from marrying a white spouse. In 1928, 
Senator Coleman Blease of South Carolina proposed an amendment that was even more severe; 
his amendment required that Congress set a punishment for interracial couples who attempted to 
get married and for people who officiated an interracial marriage. 
In Pace v. Alabama,16 the United States Supreme Court ruled that anti-miscegenation 
laws were constitutional, and did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. constitution. 
The court found that both races were treated equally, because both whites and blacks suffered 
equal punishment for violating laws against interracial marriage and interracial sex. The 
plaintiffs argued that Section 4189 of the Code of Alabama violated the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment because it imposed a more severe penalty on interracial couples 
who marry or live in adultery or fornication together than does Section 4184 of the same code, 
which imposed a penalty on any man or woman who live together in adultery or fornication.17 
The Court found no discrimination against a specific race in the two sections of the Alabama 
Code in question: 
There is in neither section any discrimination against either race. Section 4184 equally includes the offense 
when the persons of the two sexes are both white and when they are both black. Section 4189 applies the 
                                                 
16 Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583 (1883) 
17 The penalty for same-race couples living together in adultery or fornication was a $100 fine and possible 
imprisonment or hard labor for no more than six months (See Code of Alabama, Section 4184). The penalty for 
mixed-race couples who married or lived together in adultery or fornication was imprisonment or hard labor at least 
2 and no more than 7 years (See Code of Alabama, Section 4189). 
13 
 
same punishment to both offenders, the white and the black. Indeed, the offense against which this latter 
section is aimed cannot be committed without involving the persons of both races in the same punishment. 
Whatever discrimination is made in the punishment prescribed in the two sections is directed against the 
offense designated and not against the person of any particular color or race. The punishment of each 
offending person, whether white or black, is the same.18 
 
By framing an offense committed by two people of the same race, whether white or black, as 
separate from an offense committed by two people of different races, the Court justified the 
difference in the severity of punishment between the two offenses and found no discrimination 
against a specific race. The punishment for the first offense was the same for white couples as it 
was for black couples, and the punishment for the second offense was the same for both people 
involved in the relationship, whether white or black. We see here the equal application theory of 
equal protection at work: Because the punishment was equally applied to both races, the Court 
was able to rule that no discrimination against a specific race was present, and thus the law was 
upheld. We will see this equal application argument in later same-sex marriage cases, used in 
defense of anti-same-sex marriage statutes. 
In 1948, the California Supreme Court in Perez v. Sharp19 ruled California’s anti-
miscegenation statute unconstitutional. The petitioners, a white woman and black man, were 
denied a marriage license by the County Clerk of Los Angeles County based on Civil Code, 
Section 69: “no license may be issued authorizing the marriage of a white person with a Negro, 
mulatto, Mongolian or member of the Malay race.” The petitioners argued that this statute denied 
their free exercise of religion as guaranteed by the constitution because they were not able to 
“participate fully in the sacraments of that religion.”20 The Court, stating that the First 
Amendment’s religion clauses were “encompassed in the concept of liberty in the Fourteenth 
                                                 
18 106 U.S. 583, 585 (1883) 
19 Perez v. Sharp, 32 Cal.2d 711 (1948) 
20 Ibid., 713 
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Amendment,” cited Skinner v. Oklahoma,21 in which marriage was determined a fundamental 
right. Wrote the Court: 
Since the right to marry is the right to join in marriage with the person of one's choice, a statute that 
prohibits an individual from marrying a member of a race other than his own restricts the scope of his 
choice and thereby restricts his right to marry. It must therefore be determined whether the state can restrict 
that right on the basis of race alone without violating the equal protection of the laws clause of the United 
States Constitution.22 
 
Citing several previous opinions regarding racial discrimination, including Yik Wo v. Hopkins,23 
Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad,24 Hill v. Texas,25 and Hirabayashi v. United States,26 the Court 
concluded that “a state law prohibiting members of one race from marrying members of another 
race is not designed to meet a clear and present peril arising out of an emergency.”27 The Court 
addressed the equal application argument presented in support of anti-miscegenation laws (also 
employed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Pace). The argument, of course, is that the anti-
miscegenation laws do not discriminate against any racial group because it applies equally to 
people of all races; just as whites are prohibited from marrying blacks, blacks are prohibited 
from marrying whites. “The decisive question, however,” wrote the Court, 
 
is not whether different races, each considered as a group, are equally treated. The right to marry is the 
right of individuals, not of racial groups. The equal protection clause of the United States Constitution does 
not refer to rights of the Negro race, the Caucasian race, or any other race, but to the rights of 
individuals…In construing the equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution, the United States 
Supreme Court has declared that the constitutionality of state action must be tested according to whether 
the rights of an individual are restricted because of his race.28 
 
                                                 
21 Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). The Court in Skinner called marriage “one of the basic civil 
rights of man. Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race.” 
22 Perez, at 715 
23 118 U.S. 356 (1886). Yik Wo v. Hopkins, in which the denial of permits to Chinese laundry business owners was 
challenged, was the first time a law that was race-neutral on its face but administered in a discriminatory manner 
was ruled a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.  
24 271 U.S. 500 (1926) 
25 316 U.S. 400 (1942) 
26 320 U.S. 81 (1943) 
27 Perez, at 716 
28 Perez, at 716, internal citations omitted. 
15 
 
The Court discussed several prior cases in which separate but equal facilities were ruled as non-
discriminatory, such as travel on trains,29 because they adequately furnished all individuals with 
“substantially equal treatment”30 in spite of separate facilities. However, the Court found that this 
ruling was “clearly inapplicable to the right of an individual to marry. Since the essence of the 
right to marry is the freedom to join in marriage with the person of one's choice, a segregation 
statute for marriage necessarily impairs the right to marry.”31 The Court also found no public 
interest or matter of legitimate concern to the state that requires the prohibition of interracial 
marriage. For example, the state has a legitimate interest in prohibiting people infected with 
dangerous transmittable diseases from marrying; however, any statute proscribing such a 
prohibition “must be based on tests of the individual, not on arbitrary classifications of groups or 
races, and must be administered without discrimination on the grounds of race.”32 The sections 
of the California Civil Code in question were not motivated by a state interest in preventing the 
transmission of disease or any other legitimate concern; rather they “make race and not disease 
the disqualification…By restricting the individual's right to marry on the basis of race alone, they 
violate the equal protection of the laws clause of the United States Constitution.”33 
The Court also examined the history of the arguments in support of the sections of the 
California Civil Code in question to determine whether there are “exceptional circumstances”34 
to justify the prohibition of mixed-race marriage. The Court found that the arguments in support 
of the statutes included the assumption that other races are inferior to the Caucasian race, and 
that mixed-race marriages are “unnatural” and lead to undesirable offspring that are “inferior” to 
                                                 
29 See McCabe v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co., 235 U.S. 151 (1914) 
30 Perez, at 717 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid., at 718 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid., at 719 
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the offspring of same-race marriages.35 And the respondent in Perez tried to justify the statutes in 
question by arguing that “the prohibition of intermarriage between Caucasians and members of 
the specified races prevents the Caucasian race from being contaminated by races whose 
members are by nature physically and mentally inferior to Caucasians.”36 The Court found the 
argument that non-Caucasians are physically inferior to Caucasians to be “without scientific 
proof,” and furthermore “fails to take account of the physical disabilities of Caucasians and… 
variations among non-Caucasians.”37 In response to the claim that other races are mentally 
inferior to Caucasians, the Court found that “there is no certain correlation between race and 
intelligence,” there have been intelligent and mentally inferior individuals in all races, and “the 
Legislature has not made an intelligence test a prerequisite to marriage.”38 Note that the Court 
again appealed to an analysis of the individual over the generalization of an entire race based on 
stereotypes or differences often due to environmental factors. The respondents argued that 
people wishing to intermarry often come from the “dregs of society,” would produce children 
that would be a burden to the community, and also that interracial marriage would result in racial 
tension within the community. The Court found that there is no law that prohibits marriage 
among members of the “dregs of society, while also noting that this term cannot be defined and 
could not be defined on the basis of race alone. It rejected the respondents’ claim of the adverse 
effects of interracial marriage on progeny, noting that the respondents relied on Buck v. Bell,39 a 
case which dealt with the mentally ill and is not applicable here. The Court also cited Buchanan 
v. Warley,40 in which the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that although preservation of the public 
                                                 
35 Scott v. State, 39 Ga. 321, 324 (1869) 
36 Perez, at 722 
37 Perez, at 723 
38 Perez, at 724 
39 274 U.S. 200 (1927) 
40 245 U.S. 60, 81, (1917), addressing racial segregation in residential areas. 
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peace was desirable, “this aim cannot be accomplished by laws or ordinances which deny rights 
created or protected by the Federal Constitution.” Race tension cannot be stopped by keeping 
laws that segregate by race and were influenced by the same racial prejudices that caused the 
race tension in the first place, argued the Court. In this case, “A member of any [race]…may find 
himself barred by law from marrying the person of his choice and that person to him may be 
irreplaceable.”41 The Court therefore concluded that “careful examination of the arguments in 
support of the legislation in question reveals that ‘there is absent the compelling justification 
which would be needed to sustain discrimination of that nature.’”42 Furthermore, found the 
Court, “the fact alone that the discrimination has been sanctioned by the state for many years 
does not supply such justification.”43 
The Court also stated that any law that regulates a fundamental right, such as marriage, 
must be clear in its purpose for regulating that right. It argued that the statute in question is “too 
vague and uncertain to be upheld as a valid regulation of the right to marry”44 because the 
“legislature has made no provision for applying the statute to persons of mixed ancestry.”45 In 
summarizing its opinion, the Court stated the following: 
In summary, we hold that sections 60 and 69 are not only too vague and uncertain to be enforceable 
regulations of a fundamental right, but that they violate the equal protection of the laws clause of the United 
States Constitution by impairing the right of individuals to marry on the basis of race alone and by 
arbitrarily and unreasonably discriminating against certain racial groups.46 
 
In 1967, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Loving v. Virginia47 that prohibitions on 
interracial marriage were unconstitutional. This ruling effectively voided the remaining laws that 
prohibited miscegenation in seventeen states; all of them were southern states and they included 
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all the former slave states plus Oklahoma. Like the California Supreme Court did in Perez, here 
the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the equal application argument and found that laws prohibiting 
interracial marriage violated both the equal protection and due process clauses of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
The plaintiffs in Loving were convicted of violating sections 20-58 and 20-59 of the 
Virginia Code, which prohibited marriage between a white person and a non-white person under 
penalty of one to five years in prison and subjected any couple who left Virginia to be married 
and then returned to the state to this same penalty. 
The Court acknowledged the state’s reliance on Pace v. Alabama to support its equal 
application argument, but rejected this reasoning and cited its opinion in McLaughlin v. 
Florida,48 which had rejected equal application in the case of interracial cohabitation. Wrote the 
Court: 
Because we reject the notion that the mere "equal application" of a statute containing racial classifications 
is enough to remove the classifications from the Fourteenth Amendment's proscription of all invidious 
racial discriminations, we do not accept the State's contention that these statutes should be upheld if there is 
any possible basis for concluding that they serve a rational purpose.49 
 
The Court also found that the state’s purpose in upholding the anti-miscegenation statute was 
clearly directed at maintaining white supremacy, calling the statute in question “obviously an 
endorsement of the doctrine of White Supremacy.”50 Also, “The fact that Virginia prohibits only 
interracial marriages involving white persons demonstrates that the racial classifications must 
stand on their own justification, as measures designed to maintain White Supremacy.”51 The 
Court cited the opinion of the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, which had affirmed the 
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plaintiffs’ conviction and relied on its prior opinion in Naim v. Naim52 where the preservation of 
Virginia citizens’ racial integrity and the prevention of “the corruption of blood,” “a mongrel 
breed of citizens,” and “the obliteration of racial pride” were deemed legitimate purposes of the 
state.53 The Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals had also reasoned that marriage should be 
regulated exclusively by the state without federal intervention, and relies on Maynard v. Hill54 
and the Tenth Amendment. But, argued the Supreme Court in Loving, the State did not claim that 
“its powers to regulate marriage are unlimited notwithstanding…the Fourteenth Amendment,”55 
and that it cannot do so considering the opinions in Meyer v. Nebraska56 and Skinner v. 
Oklahoma.57 The state argued instead, as paraphrased by the Supreme Court, that “the meaning 
of the Equal Protection Clause, as illuminated by the statements of the Framers, is only that state 
penal laws containing an interracial element as part of the definition of the offense must apply 
equally to whites and Negroes in the sense that members of each race are punished to the same 
degree.”58 The state concluded from this reasoning that because the statutes in question punish 
equally both the white and black participants in an interracial marriage, “these statutes, despite 
their reliance on racial classifications, do not constitute an invidious discrimination based upon 
race.”59 The state advanced a second argument, which assumed the validity of the equal 
application theory; the state argued that if the Fourteenth Amendment did not prohibit anti-
miscegenation laws because of their reliance on a racial classification, then “the question of 
constitutionality would thus become whether there was any rational basis for a State to treat 
interracial marriages differently from other marriages.” The state argued that the scientific 
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evidence was in doubt and therefore, the Supreme Court should defer to the wisdom of the state 
legislature regarding its policy toward interracial marriages. 
The Supreme Court in Loving rejected the state’s equal application argument, noting that 
the Fourteenth Amendment had traditionally required “a very heavy burden of justification” for 
statues containing racial classifications. The court admitted that equal application may be enough 
to justify statutes involving non-racial discrimination, including Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. 
New York
60 and Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers,61 in which the court had “merely asked 
whether there is any rational foundation for the discriminations, and has deferred to the wisdom 
of the state legislatures.”62 However, in Loving, the burden of justification was so high because it 
involved a racial discrimination that equal application is inapplicable. 
The state refers to statements made in the Thirty-ninth Congress during the passage of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to argue that the Framers of the Amendment did not intend for the 
Amendment to make state laws that prohibit miscegenation unconstitutional. However, the Court 
argued, these statements “pertained to the passage of specific statutes, and not to the broader, 
organic purpose of a constitutional amendment.”63 Furthermore, the Court referred to three prior 
cases in which statements made in Congress during the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment 
were considered. In Brown v. Board of Education,64 the Court called these statements 
“inconclusive [at best],” adding that “the most avid proponents of the post-War Amendments 
undoubtedly intended them to remove all legal distinctions among ‘all persons born or 
naturalized in the United States.’”65 On the other hand, “Their opponents…were antagonistic to 
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both the letter and the spirit of the Amendments, and wished them to have the most limited 
effect.”66 The Court also relied on its opinions in Strauder v. West Virginia67 and McLaughlin v. 
Florida, and concluded the following: 
We have rejected the proposition that the debates in the Thirty-ninth Congress or in the state legislatures 
which ratified the Fourteenth Amendment supported the theory advanced by the State, that the requirement 
of equal protection of the laws is satisfied by penal laws defining offenses based on racial classifications so 
long as white and Negro participants in the offense were similarly punished.68 
 
The Court cited McLaughlin again to note that it rejected the reasoning in Pace v. Alabama that 
supported equal application: “Pace represents a limited view of the Equal Protection Clause 
which has not withstood analysis in the subsequent decisions of this Court.”69 Citing a long list 
of precedent, the Court stated that “the clear and central purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment 
was to eliminate all official state sources of invidious racial discrimination in the States.”70 It 
required that the Court consider, for all classifications, whether the statute in question 
“constitute[s] an arbitrary and invidious discrimination.”71 
There is no question, the Court found, that “Virginia's miscegenation statutes rest solely 
upon distinctions drawn according to race. The statutes proscribe generally accepted conduct if 
engaged in by members of different races.”72 Because this classification involved race, it was 
subject to the “most rigid scrutiny,”73 and, in order to be upheld, “must be shown to be necessary 
to the accomplishment of some permissible state objective, independent of the racial 
discrimination which it was the object of the Fourteenth Amendment to eliminate.”74 The Court 
noted that two of its members previously stated in McLaughlin that they “cannot conceive of a 
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valid legislative purpose . . . which makes the color of a person's skin the test of whether his 
conduct is a criminal offense.”75 Thus, the Court concluded here that because the purpose of 
these anti-miscegenation statutes was clearly to maintain white supremacy since the statutes only 
prohibited interracial marriage involving white people, 
There is patently no legitimate overriding purpose independent of invidious racial discrimination which justifies 
this classification…There can be no doubt that restricting the freedom to marry solely because of racial 
classifications violates the central meaning of the Equal Protection Clause. 
 
The Court also found that the statutes in question violated the plaintiffs of liberty without due 
process because “the freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital personal 
rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.”76 It cited Skinner and Maynard, 
which called marriage “one of the ‘basic civil rights of man,’ fundamental to our very existence 
and survival.”77 The Court referred to a “freedom of choice to marry,” which cannot be restricted 
by invidious racial discriminations, and stated that this freedom to marry or not marry a person 
of another race “resides with the individual, and cannot be infringed by the state.”78 
The U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion in Loving v. Virginia rendered unenforceable all 
remaining state restrictions on interracial marriage. However, South Carolina and Alabama did 
not formally amend their constitutions to remove language prohibiting interracial marriage until 
1998 and 2000, respectively. 62 percent of voters in South Carolina and 59 percent of voters in 
Alabama voted to remove this language from their respective constitutions.79 Approval of 
interracial marriage by Americans has risen gradually in the past 50 years and since the Loving 
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opinion, according to Gallup polls.80 A June 2007 poll indicated 77 percent approval for 
marriage between a white person and a black person and 17 percent disapproval, which is the 
highest overall approval and lowest overall disapproval since Gallup started the poll in 
September 1958 (The 1958 poll indicated a mere 4 percent approval and 94 percent disapproval). 
Blacks still approve of interracial marriage at a higher rate (85 percent) than whites, a trend that 
has been apparent since blacks were first included in this poll in 1968. 
A history of miscegenation in the United States shows a reliance on due process and 
equal protection arguments. Court opinions in cases like Pace v. Alabama, Perez v. Sharp, and 
Loving v. Virginia were based on these arguments and whether restrictions against interracial 
marriage violated due process and equal protection provisions of the U.S. and state constitutions. 
Due process and equal protection claims for the legalization of same-sex marriage emerged from 
this history, as we will see in the next section. 
 
 
B. The Gay Rights Movement and Early Same-Sex Marriage Litigation 
 
This section highlights the major events of the gay rights movement and the early wave 
of same-sex marriage litigation. An exploration of the historical foundations of the gay rights 
movement provides background to the origins of the same-sex marriage movement. A look at the 
first wave of same-sex marriage litigation reveals the emergence of race-based due process and 
equal protection arguments applied to same-sex marriage debates. This history sets up a view of 
the evolution of race-based Fourteenth Amendment interpretations from early to more recent 
same-sex marriage litigation. This history also highlights a major difference between 
miscegenation debates and early same-sex marriage debates: the emergence of the definitional 
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argument against same-sex marriage, which has become a central component of recent LGBT 
marriage debates, litigation, and court decisions. 
The first major event that gave a public voice to the LGBT rights movement was the 
founding of the Scientific-Humanitarian Committee in Berlin in 189781. This committee 
published literature and advocated legal reform in Germany, Austria, and the Netherlands, and 
their founder82 opened the Institute for Sexual Science in 1919, which specialized in sex 
research. This committee’s work resulted in some degree of freedom for gays and lesbians in the 
Weimar Republic, although Hitler’s rise to power put a stop to their work. Other organizations 
formed in the early 20th century that gave some voice to gays and lesbians included the British 
Society for the Study of Sex Psychology83 and the Society for Human Rights in the United 
States.84  
Gay and lesbian political activity was still not very visible despite the work of these 
organizations, but this began to change during World War II. During the war and its aftermath, 
many more young people came to the cities and more visibility was achieved by the movement. 
Many additional organizations were formed, including the Culture and Recreation Centre85 in 
Amsterdam, and the Mattachine society86 and the Daughters of Bilitis87 in the United States. A 
national gay periodical, ONE: The Homosexual Magazine, began publication in 1953. In 1954 
the Los Angeles Postmaster declared the October issue of ONE obscene and undeliverable and 
                                                 
81 gay rights movement. (2009). In Encyclopædia Britannica. Retrieved December 05, 2009, from Encyclopædia 
Britannica Online: http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/766382/gay-rights-movement  
82 The founder of the Scientific-Humanitarian Committee was Magnus Hirschfeld, who in 1928 sponsored the 
World League of Sexual Reform. 
83 The British Society for the Study of Sex Psychology was founded in 1914 by Edward Carpenter and Havelock 
Ellis for educational purposes. 
84 The Society for Humans Rights was established in 1924 by Henry Gerber and chartered by the state of Illinois. 
85 Founded in 1946. 
86 The Mattachine society was the first major male organization; it was founded in 1950-1951 was Harry Hay. Its 
name was supposedly derived from a medieval French society of masked players, the Société Mattachine, as 
representative of the public masking of homosexuality. 
87 The Daughters of Bilitis were founded in 1955 by Phyllis Lyon and Del Martin in San Francisco, this group was a 
leading women’s organization; the name comes from the Sapphic love poems of Pierre Louys, Chansons de Bilitis. 
25 
 
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed88; however, the Supreme Court reversed the Circuit 
Court’s decision89, citing Roth v. United States90, in the first explicit Supreme Court ruling on 
homosexuality. 
A routine raid by two detectives and several police officers of the Stonewall Inn in New 
York’s Greenwich Village on the night of June 27, 1969 set off rioting in what is now considered 
one of the major milestones in the gay rights movement.91 As police escorted patrons out of the 
bar, a crowd of angry onlookers gathered on the street outside the inn and battled with police, 
using coins, beer bottles, and sticks92. Although the Stonewall Riots did not solely initiate the 
gay rights movement, this event “ultimately came to symbolize the overthrow of decades of 
official harassment, repression, and degradation”; it also “changed history and breathed life into 
the then dormant and internally conflicted homophile movement.”93 Stonewall did mark the 
beginning of the modern, more national gay rights movement in the U.S.94 
One year after the Stonewall Riots, in June 1970, a march was organized in New York 
City to commemorate the Riots. Gay Pride is now celebrated around the world every year in 
June. Shortly after the riots, gay organizations began to spring up in New York, California, and 
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around the country.95 A new age of political and legal activism has begun for the gay rights 
movement, particularly legal activism concerning marriage. 
The movement to legalize same-sex marriage has become a major element of the gay 
rights movement. The first such litigation effort resulted in Baker v. Nelson,96 a Minnesota 
Supreme Court opinion which ruled that Minnesota law did not allow same-sex couples to 
marry, and furthermore that the failure to allow same-sex couples to marry did not violate the 
constitution. The court was not persuaded by the petitioners’ dual argument that prohibition of 
same-sex marriage denies a fundamental right based on the ninth amendment, and deprives them 
of liberty and property without due process and equal protection through the fourteenth 
amendment. The court also rejected the petitioners’ reliance upon Loving v. Virginia97: “there is 
a clear distinction between a marital restriction based merely upon race and one based upon the 
fundamental difference in sex.”98 An appeal of Baker to the U.S. Supreme Court was dismissed 
for want of a federal question. The next case that dealt with same-sex marriage took place in 
1971. In Anonymous v. Anonymous, 99 the New York Supreme Court decided a case in which a 
marriage was performed for two males where one of the males was thought to be a female. The 
male thought to be a female (the defendant) later underwent an operation to have his 
reproductive organs removed, and sent the medical bills to the petitioner. The court declared that 
no marriage could legally have taken place between the plaintiff and the defendant based on the 
definition of marriage as the union of one man and one woman: “The law makes no provision for 
a ‘marriage’ between persons of the same sex. Marriage is and always has been a contract 
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between a man and a woman.”100 A 1973 Kentucky appellate court opinion101 defined marriage 
as the union of one man and one woman, and stated that the purpose of marriage was to found 
and maintain a family, making same-sex marriage impossible by definition. Jones v. Hallahan 
relied heavily on the Minnesota court’s decision in Baker and the New York court’s opinion in 
Anonymous. The court refused to authorize the issuance of a marriage license to a couple who 
were both female because what they proposed was not a marriage. Additionally, it found “no 
constitutional sanction or protection of the right of marriage between persons of the same 
sex.”102 The 1974 Washington appellate court opinion Singer v. Hara103 found that it was 
“apparent from a plain reading of our marriage statutes that the legislature has not authorized 
same-sex marriages”104 and that “same-sex relationships are outside of the proper definition of 
marriage.”105 Because what the appellants proposed was not marriage, stated the court in Singer, 
an argument to analogize Loving and Perez to same-sex marriage was inapplicable. In 1982, the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Adams v. Howerton106, in affirming the decision of the district 
court107, found that Congress rationally intended to deny preferential status to the spouses of 
homosexual marriage, perhaps “because homosexual marriages never produce offspring, because 
they are not recognized in most, if in any, of the states, or because they violate traditional and 
often prevailing societal mores.”108 Furthermore, “Congress's decision to confer spouse status … 
only upon the parties to heterosexual marriages has a rational basis and therefore comports with 
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the due process clause and its equal protection requirements.”109 The district court’s opinion had 
relied on Baker, Anonymous, Hallahan, and Singer as precedent in affirming that marriage by 
definition is a union of a man and a woman, and therefore same-sex marriage is impossible. 
Because the “unvarying legal concept and definition” of marriage required persons of different 
sexes, “there can be no equal protection or due process violation when persons of the same sex 
attempt to bring themselves within the meaning of the term ‘marriage’ or ‘spouse.’ Whatever 
classification may be involved is thus reasonable and proper.” 110 Howerton also placed great 
emphasis on the importance of heterosexual marriage for procreation and perpetuation of the 
human race: “It seems beyond dispute that the state has a compelling interest in encouraging and 
fostering procreation of the race and providing status and stability to the environment in which 
children are raised.”111 The court went on to say that the state has chosen the “least intrusive 
alternative available to protect the procreative relationship”112 and that this classification is 
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. 
An examination of the history of early same-sex marriage litigation shows that race-based 
due process and equal protection interpretations were used in these debates, but that courts 
routinely rejected petitioners’ reliance on such interpretations based on the traditional definition 
of marriage as a union of one man and one woman. The emergence of these race-based 
interpretations in the first wave of same-sex marriage litigation helps to frame my examination of 
more recent litigation in a historical context and show how the application of race-based 
interpretations of due process and equal protection to same-sex marriage litigation has evolved 
since 1970. This history also shows the origins of the definitional argument, how the treatment of 
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this argument has evolved over time, and sets the stage for my suggestion of a better approach to 
the definitional argument. 
 
C. Recent Same-Sex Marriage Litigation (1990-2010) and the State of Same-Sex Marriage 
Today 
 
This section provides an overview of same-sex marriage litigation between 1990 and 
2010 and context for the debate by explaining the state of same-sex marriage today. In recent 
court opinions regarding same-sex marriage, those same race-based interpretations that were 
present in the first wave of litigation and court opinions have been used again. However, unlike 
in the first wave when courts rejected petitioners’ reliance on cases like Loving and Perez as 
precedent to legalize same-sex marriage, many of these recent opinions have accepted racial 
arguments to advance same-sex marriage. This section also looks at two cases central to the gay 
rights movement that do not explicitly involve marriage, but that highlight the importance of due 
process and equal protection arguments to both LGBT rights and same-sex marriage debates. 
This final section of chapter I serves to introduce my examination of the use of race-based 
interpretations of due process and equal protection in same-sex marriage litigation by LGBT 
advocates, in order to see how these racial arguments have been employed in case briefs and how 
these arguments can be further improved. 
Hawaii was the first state in which a court ruled in favor of same-sex marriage. The 
Hawaii Supreme Court ruled in its 1993 opinion Baehr v. Lewin113 that the state’s refusal to grant 
marriage licenses to same-sex couples was discriminatory. The Court found that this practice 
violated the equal protection clause of the Hawaii constitution based on gender discrimination, 
and that classifications by gender are subject to strict scrutiny under the Hawaii constitution. 
Thus, the statute in question was presumed to be unconstitutional “unless Lewin, as an agent of 
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the State of Hawaii, can show that (a) the statute's sex-based classification is justified by 
compelling state interests and (b) the statute is narrowly drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgments 
of the applicant couples' constitutional rights.”114 Lewin argued that the appellants could form a 
marriage not because of state-sanctioned discrimination that may violate the equal protection 
clause, but because “of their biologic inability as a couple to satisfy the definition of the status to 
which they aspire,”115 a position that the Court rejected as “circular and unpersuasive.”116 Lewin 
relied primarily upon four court decisions to support his argument: Baker v. Nelson, Jones v. 
Hallahan, Singer v. Hara, and De Santo v. Barnsley.117 The Hawaii Court rejected his use of 
these opinions. In Baker, the Minnesota court ruled that current state statutes did not authorize 
same-sex marriage, which the Hawaii Court also found, and that the United States constitution 
was not violated. “Apparently, no state constitutional questions were raised and none were 
addressed,”118 observed the Hawaii Court; thus, Baker was distinguishable from Baehr. 
Similarly, it found De Santo to be distinguishable from Baehr, as De Santo “held only that 
common law same-sex marriage did not exist in Pennsylvania, a result irrelevant to the present 
case.”119 The appellants in De Santo did claim a violation of equal rights under Pennsylvania’s 
Equal Rights Amendment, but this was denied by the appellate court because the issue had not 
been raised in the trial court. In Jones, the Hawaii court found it significant that “the appellants' 
equal protection rights—federal or state—were not asserted in Jones, and, accordingly, the 
appeals court was relieved of the necessity of addressing and attempting to distinguish the 
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decision of the United States Supreme Court in Loving.”120 The Hawaii Court found the Loving 
opinion to be vital to the same-sex marriage issue, stating the following: 
The facts in Loving and the respective reasoning of the Virginia courts, on the one hand, and the United 
States Supreme Court, on the other, both discredit the reasoning of Jones and unmask the tautological and 
circular nature of Lewin's argument that HRS § 572-1 does not implicate article I, section 5 of the Hawaii 
Constitution because same sex marriage is an innate impossibility. Analogously to Lewin's argument and 
the rationale of the Jones court, the Virginia courts declared that interracial marriage simply could not exist 
because the Deity had deemed such a union intrinsically unnatural, and, in effect, because it had theretofore 
never been the "custom" of the state to recognize mixed marriages, marriage "always" having been 
construed to presuppose a different configuration. … [T]rial judges are [not] the ultimate authorities on the 
subject of Divine Will, and, as Loving amply demonstrates, constitutional law may mandate, like it or not, 
that customs change with an evolving social order.121 
 
In Singer v. Hara, the Washington appellate court did not dispute that the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause required strict judicial scrutiny for sex discrimination. 
However, it still did not declare Washington’s anti-miscegenation laws unconstitutional based on 
the same reasoning in Jones, that the nature of marriage excluded same-sex couples from the 
institution. The Hawaii Court “reject[ed] this exercise in tortured and conclusory sophistry.”122 
While finding that Hawaii’s refusal to grant marriage licenses to same-sex couples 
violated the state’s Equal Protection Clause, the Court rejected the appellants’ due process claim 
that they have a right to same-sex marriage: 
We do not believe that a right to same-sex marriage is so rooted in the traditions and collective conscience 
of our people that failure to recognize it would violate the fundamental principles of liberty and justice that 
lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions. Neither do we believe that a right to same-sex 
marriage is implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that neither liberty nor justice would exist if it 
were sacrificed. Accordingly, we hold that the applicant couples do not have a fundamental constitutional 
right to same-sex marriage arising out of the right to privacy or otherwise.123 
 
Although it rejected the due process claim, the Court vacated the decision of the circuit court and 
remanded the case, ordering that “in accordance with the ‘strict scrutiny’ standard, the burden 
will rest on Lewin to overcome the presumption that HRS § 572-1 is unconstitutional by 
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demonstrating that it furthers compelling state interests and is narrowly drawn to avoid 
unnecessary abridgments of constitutional rights.”124 In Baehr v. Miike125 the Hawaii Court again 
ruled on this issue, declaring that the defendant was unable to prove that there was a compelling 
state interest behind his refusal to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples, and that therefore 
his refusal was unconstitutional. In 1998, however, Hawaii voters approved a state constitutional 
amendment that gave the Hawaii legislature the power to ban same-sex marriage, and the 
legislature passed a bill that did so. 
In 1996, Congress passed and President Bill Clinton signed into law the Defense of 
Marriage Act,126 which stated that no state would be required to legally recognize a same-sex 
marriage that was performed in another state, and that the federal government defined marriage 
as the union of one man and one woman. It is interesting to note that President Clinton, who in 
1996 declared himself opposed to the legalization of same-sex marriage,127 appears to have 
changed his opinion on this issue based on recent remarks in 2009.128 President Barack Obama’s 
2008 campaign platform included a full repeal of the Defense of Marriage Act,129 but the Justice 
Department filed an amicus brief supporting the constitutionality of DOMA in 2009.130 The 
Justice Department stated that it was merely continuing its standard practice of defending 
existing law.131 President Obama did actively campaign on the pledge to end the military’s 
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“Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” policy, and in his State of the Union Address on January 27, 2010, he 
announced that he would work with Congress and the military during 2010 to “finally repeal the 
law that denies gay Americans the right to serve the country they love because of who they 
are.”132 
Two recent U.S. Supreme Court cases that do not deal explicitly with same-sex marriage 
but have been influential in several recent state court opinions regarding same-sex marriage 
include Romer v. Evans133 and Lawrence v. Texas.134 In Romer, the Court used an equal 
protection argument to strike down an amendment to the Colorado Constitution that prohibited 
all legislative, executive, or judicial action designed to protect homosexual persons from 
discrimination. Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, concluded that “Amendment 2 
classifies homosexuals not to further a proper legislative end but to make them unequal to 
everyone else. This Colorado cannot do…Amendment 2 violates the Equal Protection 
Clause.”135 Amendment 2, he wrote, was a “status-based enactment” which had no “relationship 
to legitimate state interests,” and was “a classification of persons undertaken for its own sake, 
something the Equal Protection Clause does not permit.”136 The state argued that Amendment 2 
put gays and lesbians in the same position as all other citizens because it “does no more than 
deny homosexuals special rights.”137 The Court rejected this argument and found that the 
amendment actually “imposes a special disability upon those persons alone. Homosexuals are 
forbidden the safeguards that others enjoy or may seek without constraint.”138 The Court also 
found that Amendment 2 failed rational basis review because it “impos[ed] a broad and 
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undifferentiated disability on a single named group, [which was] an…invalid form of 
legislation,” and because it “lack[ed] a rational relationship to legitimate state interests.”139 
In Lawrence, Justice Kennedy used a due process argument to strike down a Texas law 
that banned sodomy between two males, while Justice O’Connor, in concurring, argued that the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause should be controlling instead of the 
substantive component of the Due Process Clause. Justice Kennedy’s opinion found an 
individual liberty and privacy interest, stemming from substantive due process, to engage in 
private conduct. In overruling Bowers v. Hardwick,140 the Court relied on Justice Stevens’ 
dissenting opinion in Bowers and argued that his opinion should be controlling here: 
Our prior cases make two propositions abundantly clear. First, the fact that the governing majority in a 
State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law 
prohibiting the practice; neither history nor tradition could save a law prohibiting miscegenation from 
constitutional attack. Second, individual decisions by married persons, concerning the intimacies of their 
physical relationship, even when not intended to produce offspring, are a form of “liberty” protected by the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Moreover, this protection extends to intimate choices 
by unmarried as well as married persons.141 
 
Justice O’Connor noted in her concurring opinion that the Texas laws made sodomy a crime only 
if the participants engaging in sodomy were of the same sex, while sodomy between opposite sex 
partners was not a crime. Thus, “Texas treats the same conduct differently based solely on the 
participants,” and “those harmed by this law are people who have a same-sex sexual orientation 
and thus are more likely to engage in [sodomy].” This law, she argued, “makes homosexuals 
unequal in the eyes of the law by making particular conduct—and only that conduct—subject to 
criminal sanction.”142 Texas argued that this discrimination served a legitimate state interest in 
promoting morality. But Justice O’Connor rejected this argument, stating that “moral 
disapproval of a group cannot be a legitimate governmental interest under the Equal Protection 
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Clause because legal classifications must not be ‘drawn for the purpose of disadvantaging the 
group burdened by the law.”143 She found no legitimate state interest in a law that distinguished 
between heterosexuals and homosexuals as applied to private, consensual conduct, and thus 
concluded that it failed rational basis review. She added that her opinion did not mean “other 
laws distinguishing between heterosexuals and homosexuals would similarly fail under rational 
basis review;” marriage laws, for instance, that distinguished between heterosexuals and 
homosexuals had other reasons to be upheld “beyond mere moral disapproval of an excluded 
group.”144 
The first state to legalize same-sex marriage was Massachusetts in 2003, following the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court’s decision in Goodridge v. Department of Public 
Health.145 The California Supreme Court struck down a statewide ban on same-sex marriage in 
2008 in In Re Marriage Cases146 based on an equal protection and due process analysis and strict 
scrutiny, but California voters passed Proposition Eight on Election Day 2008, which established 
a state constitutional amendment banning same-sex marriage. Also in 2008, the Connecticut 
Supreme Court declared a statewide ban on same-sex marriage unconstitutional through equal 
protection and due process analysis based on intermediate scrutiny in Kerrigan v. Commissioner 
of Public Health.147 The Iowa Supreme Court in the 2009 case Varnum v. Brien148 ruled that 
barring same-sex marriage violates the Equal Protection Clause of the state’s constitution; like 
the Connecticut Supreme Court, it employed intermediate scrutiny to arrive at its opinion. In the 
same month that Varnum was decided, the Vermont legislature overrode the governor’s veto of a 
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bill that legalized same-sex marriage. In May 2009, the Maine legislature passed and the 
governor signed into law a bill that legalized same-sex marriage, but Maine voters voted to 
repeal the law on Election Day 2009. In June 2009, the New Hampshire legislature passed and 
the governor signed into law a bill that legalized same-sex marriage. 
As of May 2010, same-sex marriage is legal in and granted by five states: Massachusetts, 
Connecticut, Iowa, Vermont, and New Hampshire. 30 states have passed constitutional 
amendments banning same-sex marriage, and twelve states have statutes that prohibit same-sex 
marriage. New York, Rhode Island, and New Mexico all do not allow same-sex marriage, but 
have no specific prohibition of such a marriage. New York recognizes same-sex marriages 
performed in other countries. Several states that prohibit same-sex marriage by either statute or 
constitutional amendment also allow same-sex civil unions that grant rights similar to marriage 
or some form of limited rights. 
We will see many of these arguments used in interracial marriage litigation and past 
same-sex marriage litigation in our examination of the case briefs in Goodridge and Kerrigan; 
Indeed, modern due process and equal protection claims in same-sex marriage litigation 
originally emerged in debates over interracial marriage that eventually resulted in Loving v. 
Virginia. By first discussing these past cases, we will find a sort of historical evolution between 
how specific racial arguments were treated in the past and how they have been used in more 
recent cases. And an exploration of cases like Perez and Loving will allow us to more fully 
understand how and why same-sex marriage advocates employ a racial interpretation of due 
process and equal protection in same-sex marriage litigation. The literature review, which I 
present next, explores the scholarly treatment of these historical race-based debates as applied to 
LGBT marriage litigation, and sets the stage for the main focus of this project.  
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II.    LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 The existing scholarly literature on the use of race in the same-sex marriage legal debate 
fails to examine case briefs, and mostly relies on court opinions and the general similarities and 
differences between interracial marriage arguments and same-sex marriage arguments. But there 
is no discussion of how LGBT advocates have actually employed racial arguments in same-sex 
marriage cases, specifically in the briefs, and that is how I intend to contribute to the literature. 
An examination of the existing scholarly literature reveals a broad range of perspectives 
concerning the use of a racial interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection 
and Due Process clauses to advance same-sex marriage litigation. Although the literature varies 
greatly, three major and distinct arguments are evident. One school of thought supports the use 
of a racial interpretation of Fourteenth Amendment clauses to advance same-sex marriage 
litigation, while a second perspective argues that a racial interpretation as applied to same-sex 
marriage litigation is an invalid legal analogy and thus should not be accepted by courts. A third 
argument rests on a critique of marriage from within the queer community, which consists of the 
belief that using a racial analogy to promote the legalization of same-sex marriage is a poor 
strategy because a racial comparison reinforces the stereotype of gays as white, affluent, and a 
politically powerful minority. The scholars that comprise this third argument disagree over 
whether and when an allusion to racial civil rights issues should be used to promote same-sex 
marriage litigation, but they agree that this racial comparison is potentially harmful to the gay 
rights and same-sex marriage movements as it imposes certain risks. As I have mentioned, the 
literature surrounding this issue focuses on court decisions and elements of similarity between 
racial minorities and sexual orientation minorities, with little discussion of how same-sex 
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marriage activists actually employ racial elements in their arguments. But I will outline the three 
major perspectives in the existing literature, because these perspectives will be important in my 
examination of case briefs later on when I look to see how these arguments have been used in the 
briefs. I also explore the importance of case briefs in the American legal system; this is vital to 
my project, as its major contribution to the scholarly literature is an examination of racial 
approaches to same-sex marriage litigation through case briefs. Lastly, I provide the project 
methodology, in which I explain specifically how I will undergo the project and contribute to the 
existing scholarly literature. 
 
A. A Racial Interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment as Applied to Same-Sex Marriage 
Litigation Provides an Appropriate Model 
 
The literature that supports a racial interpretation of the Equal Protection and Due 
Process clauses as appropriate precedent to advance same-sex marriage litigation relies on 
Loving v. Virginia. These scholars find that the use of the Equal Protection Clause in Loving for 
the purpose of rejecting racial discrimination is an appropriate legal model for same-sex 
marriage cases for the purpose of rejecting discrimination on the basis of gender and sexual 
orientation. They contend that race and sexual orientation (and thus miscegenation and same-sex 
marriage) are similar enough as characteristics of minority groups to be legally comparable, and 
therefore the legalization of interracial marriage is appropriate precedent for the legalization of 
same-sex marriage. Several of these scholars argue that the Equal Protection and Due Process 




Trosino finds that and miscegenation same-sex marriage can and should be compared.149 
In comparing interracial marriage to same-sex marriage, the he notes that gay couples face 
similar legal obstacles to those faced by interracial couples in the 1960s. He finds that arguments 
supporting prohibitions on interracial and gay marriage are unfounded, and outlines these 
arguments: those against the legalization of interracial marriage include white supremacy, the 
protection and sanctity of white womanhood, the prevention of mixed-race offspring, and a 
feared loss of political power and sexual power over white women. Those arguments against the 
legalization of same-sex marriage include the beliefs that homosexuality is unnatural, same-sex 
marriage would encourage homosexuality, and same-sex marriage provides a confusing 
environment in which to raise children. All of these arguments against same-sex marriage, 
argues Trosino, are based on the beliefs that homosexuality is wrong and that heterosexuality is 
superior to homosexuality. He concludes that many of the arguments against miscegenation and 
same-sex marriage are “strikingly similar”,150 and that the courts should legalize same-sex 
marriage based in large part on the legal history of interracial marriage. Although Trosino 
focuses on the social dimension of this issue in examining the similarities of these arguments, the 
similarities exposed set the framework for an equal protection argument. These arguments help 
to show that gays and lesbians can be considered a “discrete or insular minority” on the basis of 
sexual orientation with a history of discrimination and relative political powerlessness, just as 
blacks are a discrete or insular minority on the basis of race because of their history of 
discrimination and political powerlessness. These aspects of both minority groups are part of the 
criteria for a suspect class under equal protection claims. 
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Eskridge calls the similarities in the prohibitions against interracial and same-sex 
marriage “clear. Virginia and other states relied on precisely the same definitional (marriage has 
never included different-race couples), morality-based (God ordained this), and pragmatic 
(people would be upset) arguments to prohibit different-race marriages that states now invoke to 
prohibit same-sex marriages.”151 White supremacy is the ideology that underlay interracial 
marriage prohibitions just as homophobia is the ideology that underlies same-sex marriage 
prohibitions, and both ideologies “rest upon hate and fear.”152 Eskridge argues that same-sex 
marriage can be legalized based on the Equal Protection argument in Loving. Because the 
prohibition against same-sex marriage is a facial gender classification, he argues, it triggers 
heightened scrutiny just as the racial classification did in Loving. This gender classification 
cannot survive intermediate scrutiny because the “[state] justifications for prohibiting same-sex 
marriage rest upon an ideology of homophobia and rigid gender stereotypes.”153 Eskridge states 
that this prohibition may also deprive people of a fundamental right to marry under the Due 
Process clause, although he admits that Loving is primarily an Equal Protection argument with a 
very brief Due Process statement at the end; arguing for the legalization of same-sex marriage 
based on the Due Process argument in Loving alone is difficult. 
 Opponents of same-sex marriage often argue that marriage is traditionally defined as a 
union of one man and one woman; indeed, early same-sex marriage litigation efforts resulted in 
court decisions that rejected the use of Loving as precedent based on this “traditional definition” 
argument. Eskridge also attempts to show that historically, marriage has not always been defined 
in this way and that same-sex unions have had significance in many cultures. Through a detailed 
compilation of the history of marriage in many cultures and periods of world history, he finds 
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that same-sex unions have been a “valuable human institution for most of human history and in 
most known cultures.”154 The claim that the traditional definition of marriage is a union of one 
man and one woman is an important argument to counter for advocates of interracial marriage as 
a model for same-sex marriage litigation; if marriage truly is defined as a union of one man and 
one woman, then it becomes much easier to argue that the Loving decision should have little 
impact on same-sex marriage. The legalization of marriage between two persons of different 
races would not change the definition of marriage from a union of two persons of opposite 
gender to a union of two persons regardless of gender. This definitional argument also exposes 
another similarity in the arguments against both interracial marriage and same-sex marriage: 
opponents of interracial marriage argued that marriage was traditionally intended for same-race 
couples and many courts used biblical citations to support this argument, just as opponents of 
same-sex marriage argue that marriage was traditionally intended for opposite-sex couples and 
cite bible verses and religion beliefs to support their argument. 
 In a later article, Eskridge builds upon his earlier arguments.155 He argues that the reasons 
underlying the “analytically weak” arguments against gay marriage are cultural rather than 
logical or analytical. “The arguments are so weak that they smack of prejudice more than reason, 
and their appeal is certainly strong among homophobes,”156 he writes. He discusses the 
definitional argument, the defense of marriage argument, and the stamp of approval argument 
which includes the argument that gay marriage will promote homosexuality in children. In 
analyzing several court opinions starting with Loving and citing Baehr v. Lewin, Zablocki v. 
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Redhail, and Turner v. Safley, he attempts to show that legal precedent allows for the legalization 
of same-sex marriage because the courts have applied strict scrutiny to marriage cases. 
More recent scholarship has examined the Supreme Court’s rulings in Romer and 
Lawrence and their implications for same-sex marriage legalization. Emond argues that the equal 
protection analysis employed by Justice Sandra Day O’Connor in her Lawrence v. Texas 
concurrence, if applied in the same way to a law barring same-sex marriage, would render the 
law unconstitutional.157 The analysis used by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in 
Goodridge v. Department of Public Health,158 he argues, is “very similar to the searching form of 
rational review that Justice O'Connor suggested in Lawrence.”159 Reinheimer, in an attempt to 
develop a substantive, gender-conscious approach to same-sex marriage grounded in equal 
protection doctrine, finds that “the proscription of same-sex marriage operates to maintain 
unconstitutional gender inequality to the detriment not only of LGBTQ…persons, but also of 
women as a group.”160 He discusses extending the Loving analogy to fully incorporate its use of 
equal protection into same-sex marriage cases, and concludes that applying the race-based equal 
protection argument in Loving to same-sex marriage litigation shows that because same-sex 
marriage prohibitions discriminate on the basis of sex, they are subject to intermediate scrutiny 
under the Equal Protection Doctrine. In a later article, Reinheimer extends his discussion of 
Loving’s Equal Protection argument and its application to same-sex marriage litigation to include 
Lawrence. He argues that the miscegenation analogy is “both compelling and appropriate in the 
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context of sodomy statutes.”161 He argues that the due process analysis employed in Lawrence 
that focused on an individual liberty and privacy interest, although used so that legislatures could 
not amend the law to simply apply to all persons and thus making it constitutional, actually 
blunts the movement for same-sex marriage and poses dangers like increased sexual abuse. 
Indeed, Lawrence has received attention in recent court opinions about same-sex marriage, but 
the courts have hardly relied upon it in declaring that equal rights in the form of civil unions or 
marriage must be applied to same-sex couples. Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in Lawrence also 
ignores the facial sex discrimination, notes Reinheimer, and focuses on discrimination based on 
sexual orientation. He advocates for a different equality approach to Lawrence that, he argues, 
will pave the way toward same-sex marriage. The equality approach he suggests is a sex equality 
approach derived from the court’s reasoning in Loving, which rejected the equal application 
theory as part of the “separate but equal” doctrine: “Just as it was clear to the Loving Court that it 
was sophistry to claim an anti-miscegenation law constituted equal treatment, so a few courts 
have found that same-sex marriage prohibitions do in fact discriminate on the basis of sex.”162 
Loving was also about sex discrimination, he argues, because anti-miscegenation laws served to 
reinforce gender stereotypes in relationships by preserving white womanhood: “[white men] 
were…concerned about black men having sex with white women, and losing their own sexual 
access to black women.”163 By applying the equal protection analysis from Loving to Lawrence, 
Lawrence becomes a major force in the movement to legalize same-sex marriage. 
Polk argues that Montana’s marriage amendment that banned same-sex marriage is 
unconstitutional based on both the equal protection analysis in Romer and the due process 
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analysis in Lawrence.164 If the Supreme Court’s analysis and decisions in Romer and Lawrence 
are applied to the Montana marriage amendment, she writes, the amendment should be found 
unconstitutional. Barrett discusses the importance that recent state court decisions have placed on 
children of same-sex couples, and analyzes this as a new approach to legalizing same-sex 
marriage.165 He argues that only recently, the same-sex marriage debate has evolved into a 
debate that centers not only on the rights of the couple in a same-sex relationship, but also on the 
rights of the children who live with the couple. Barrett “advance[s] the possibility that this 
repeated deference to…the child, will open up a challenge to anti-gay marriage laws and 
constitutional amendments that has not previously been considered: an Equal Protection 
challenge based on a child's right to presumed legitimacy at birth.”166 
There has also been a great deal of scholarship on civil unions, namely whether civil 
unions for same-sex couples would satisfy an equal protection claim by providing similar legal 
rights to same-sex relationships as is provided to heterosexual marriages, or if the term 
“marriage” must be applied to guarantee equal protection under the law.167 This literature often 
touches on the notion that civil unions are “separate but equal,” which draws comparison to the 
landmark racial segregation case Brown v. Board of Education.168 Yan argues that the New 
Jersey constitution’s equal protection clause requires recognition of same-sex marriage.169 He 
critiques the New Jersey Supreme Court’s opinion in Lewis v. Harris,170 in which the court held 
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that the state constitution required committed same-sex couples to receive the same statutory 
rights as married couples, and asserts that a proper application of New Jersey equal protection 
case law would have guaranteed full marriage rights to same-sex couples under the New Jersey 
constitution. Howenstine provides another discussion of civil unions and the equal protection 
clause,171 arguing that Romer advances gay rights and civil unions for same-sex couples but not 
necessarily marriage. His argument is that because Class I anti-gay partnership laws (which bar 
any and all same-sex partnership rights) demonstrate a desire to harm a politically unpopular 
group (gays), these laws are subject to heightened rational basis review like the type of review 
employed in Romer v. Evans. Howenstine writes that these laws are invalid under a more 
searching form of rational basis review because “their expansive scope exceeds any rational 
relation to legitimate governmental interests in marriage and the family.”172 Additionally, he 
argues, class II anti-gay partnership laws which are more narrowly tailored to prohibit only 
comprehensive partnership benefits like marriage, “more closely approximate the disputed 
interests underlying the decision to bar same-sex couples from marrying.”173 The literature on 
civil unions is particularly important to the Connecticut same-sex marriage case, Kerrigan v. 
Commissioner of Public Health, because same-sex civil unions had already been legalized by the 
Connecticut state legislature at the time the case was argued. Kerrigan, then, was essentially a 
debate over whether civil unions satisfied the plaintiffs’ equal protection and due process claims. 
The scholarship that advocates using a racial interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment as was 
used in Loving to advance same-sex marriage litigation focuses on the Equal Protection clause; 
although a few scholars include a due process argument, it is always coupled with a more 
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confident Equal Protection argument. These scholars also reject the usefulness of Lawrence in 
advancing same-sex marriage litigation, often arguing that Justice O’Connor’s concurrence or a 
variation of her concurrence would be more useful than would Justice Kennedy’s opinion. 
However, in many ways, this focus on Equal Protection reflects Loving, which relied mostly 
upon an Equal Protection argument and in which the inclusion of a Due Process argument at the 
end appears as a mere side note to the rest of the opinion. These scholars agree that the core 
component of Loving, the Equal Protection argument, provides an appropriate legal model for 
same-sex marriage legalization, and encounter no problems with a racial interpretation of the 
Equal Protection clause as applied to same-sex marriage. 
 
B. A Racial Interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment is Not an Appropriate Model for 
Same-Sex Marriage Litigation 
 
 
 Another school of thought argues that interracial marriage and same-sex marriage are not 
similar and are not legally comparable; these scholars assert that Loving is not appropriate 
precedent for same-sex marriage litigation today, and that the Warren Court’s decision in Loving 
does not logically impel the legalization of same-sex marriage. Although the number of scholars 
in this camp is small compared to the number who find compelling legal similarities between 
Loving and same-sex marriage litigation, the literature in this area is focused and persuasive. 
Using two main arguments, this literature counters constitutional claims for the legalization of 




 Wardle counters the two main constitutional claims for the legalization of same-sex 
marriage, the substantive due process claim and the equal protection claim.174 She argues that 
there is no fundamental right to same-sex marriage; the constitutionally recognized fundamental 
right to marriage, she writes, does not apply to same-sex couples based on history, experience, 
precedent, and the fact that the nature and meaning of marriage is exclusively heterosexual. 
Furthermore, she argues that the constitutional zone of privacy does not extend to same-sex 
marriage. In countering the equal protection claim for same-sex marriage, she states that these 
arguments are flawed. She bases this assertion on a lack of scientific evidence that shows that 
homosexual behavior is immutable and that biological immutability would not advance this 
claim anyway. She also argues that both race and homosexual behavior and gender and 
homosexual behavior are not equivalent legal categories, and rejects the Loving analogy. She 
attempts to show that homosexual couples are not a discrete and insular minority, and concludes 
that “no sound basis exists for constitutionalizing the same-sex marriage issue, either in 
fundamental rights doctrine or in equal protection doctrine.”175 By eliminating the constitutional 
issues, Wardle aims to encourage more debate on the policy issues and arguments surrounding 
same-sex marriage. 
 Wilkins also counters the two major constitutional claims for same-sex marriage.176 
While acknowledging that most literature on this topic finds that laws giving preference to 
heterosexual marriage are irrational and subject to strict scrutiny, Wilkins argues the following: 
 With due respect, and knowing that the opinion expressed in this essay is in the decided academic minority, 
the current consensus is seriously flawed…Laws preferring heterosexual marriage are not subject to strict scrutiny. 
Statutory and other legal preferences for heterosexual marriage do not intrude upon a fundamental right nor are they 
based on a suspect classification. Moreover, even if strict scrutiny is invoked, marriage survives judicial analysis 
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because it furthers the most imperative of all governmental interests: “the very existence and survival of the human 
race.” Current statutory and other legal preferences for heterosexual marriage, therefore, are plainly constitutional.177 
  
Other opponents of the use of Loving as precedent for same-sex marriage litigation 
engage the social dimension in arguing that there are major differences between mixed race and 
same-sex couples. Coolidge argues that using the Loving/same-sex marriage analogy to support 
the legalization of same-sex marriage is primarily a political use rather than a legitimate legal 
argument, and therefore should have no basis in the legal debate surrounding gay marriage. He 
writes that when proponents of same-sex marriage use the Loving analogy to support their cause, 
they are playing “‘the race card’ of the marriage debate” (201). The author lays out several 
“problems” (217) with this analogy; these problems with the analogy show that the two issues 
and cases are “fundamentally different” (217). He focuses on the Loving and Baehr cases, and 
notes several differences between these two cases. First, the contrast between Virginia’s and 
Hawaii’s laws, specifically cohabitation laws; interracial couples were forbidden to cohabit in 
Virginia, while in Hawaii same-sex couples were free to cohabit, make private contractual 
promises, and receive institutional recognition.178 Second, Coolidge compares the two states: 
while the state of Virginia was a “hotbed of racial polarization,”179 Hawaii “is hardly a hotbed of 
anti-gay sentiment.”180 Looking at the specific marriage laws in each state, Coolidge finds that 
Virginia’s anti-miscegenation laws stemmed from slavery and a “zealous campaign…aimed at 
‘improving’ society.”181 If a black person and white person married, it was considered a felony. 
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Hawaii’s marriage law, however, is “positive, not prohibitory”182 in that it “imposes no penalties 
or other sanctions upon them…[R]elationships are not disturbed…by the law.”183 There were 
other states in which the Lovings could marry, but same-sex couples could not marry in any state 
when Baehr was heard. Coolidge argues that while southern anti-miscegenation laws ran counter 
to the “Western tradition of marriage law,”184 the Baehr decision ran counter to this tradition; the 
traditional definition of marriage as a union between one man and one woman is again important. 
Yet another difference is the disagreement over the pursuit of legal marriage within the gay 
community; there was little disagreement during Loving among the African-American 
community. In Baehr, the plaintiffs created a huge public education campaign than ever existed 
during Loving to teach the public about their cause, and Baehr occurred at the beginning of a 
legal revolution while Loving was “the end of a process of constitutional and popular 
deliberation stretching over decades.”185 Many gay and lesbian legal advocates were surprised by 
the Baehr decision; Lambda Legal did not join the plaintiffs until after the 1993 decision, as it 
exercised caution, as did other groups, in which cases it litigated and where as a matter of 
strategy. Although there was considerable public attention given to the Loving decision, the 
court’s ruling was somewhat expected: “The ruling…is important from the historical standpoint, 
but few observers had entertained any serious doubts as to what the court would do on the issue... 
The decision was in line with many others on racial matters that have been handed down in 
recent years.”186 Coolidge also examines amicus briefs from the Japanese-American Citizens 
League and the Roman Catholic Church, which each submitted briefs in both the Loving and 
Baehr cases; both groups supported interracial marriage, but they disagreed on Baehr. A theme 
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of Coolidge’s article is the argument that those who support the Loving analogy seek to 
undermine democracy by subverting the majority will of the people. He also refers to slavery and 
employs the argument that the oppression of black minorities was much more severe than the 
oppression of gays ever was. 
Wagner argues that anti-miscegenation laws were mostly viewed as racial laws rather 
than marriage laws and should not influence the current legal debate over same-sex marriage.187 
In arriving at this conclusion, Wagner employs an imaginary analogy between banking law and 
marriage law to show that “the correctness of Loving v. Virginia does not logically compel the 
correctness of Goodridge v. Department of Public Health”.188 This analogy, he writes, is based 
on “the claim that sexual difference is no more relevant to the nature and purpose of marriage 
than is racial sameness,”189 and that using Loving as a model for same-sex marriage litigation 
would be “socially disastrous”.190 
The scholars that disagree that a racial interpretation of the Equal Protection and Due 
Process clauses should influence same-sex marriage litigation employ the definitional argument 
and avoid core constitutional issues by focusing on differences between Loving and same-sex 
marriage cases, and racial minorities and sexual minorities. They also appeal to outdated beliefs 
about the purpose of marriage in arguing that marriage is essential to the survival of the human 
race because of its reproductive benefits. 
 
C.  The Dangers of a Racial Analogy 
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 Perhaps the most interesting perspective on the interracial/same-sex marriage analogy 
comes from Law and Society literature and gay rights activists and queer theorists who oppose 
legalizing marriage for same-sex couples for a variety of reasons. The arguments here rest on the 
belief that this racial analogy would do more harm than good for the gay rights movement, and 
this belief has enormous implications for the application of a racial interpretation of the Equal 
Protection and Due Process clauses to same-sex marriage litigation. It must be noted that these 
scholars do not specifically answer the question of whether the racial interpretation in Loving 
can or should be applied to same-sex marriage litigation; rather, their discussion of the 
interconnections, or non-interconnections, between minorities with differing characteristics like 
race and sexual orientation reveal possible limitations to using racial cases like Loving as 
precedent for same-sex marriage litigation. 
 Foster questions the rise of legal marriage to the top of the gay rights agenda.191 She 
argues that this increased push for same-sex marriage has nothing to do with the materialism of 
marriage; rather, it lies in the symbolism of marriage as an institution. She examines the 
importance of the symbolism of marriage through the lens of Critical Race Theory and previous 
civil rights struggles of other oppressed groups and states the importance of particular strategies 
at specific points in a group’s civil rights struggle. Foster asks who will benefit from the 
legalization of gay marriage and what the overall costs will be for the movement, and poses the 
possibility that the gay rights movement may eventually make the same mistakes the African-
American and feminist rights movements made in that they favored strategies that would achieve 
rights largely affecting privileged members of that group. 
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 Kendell suggests that gays fear their own history and identity will not resonate enough 
with Americans, so they display imagery of the black civil rights struggle. She argues that gays 
should not use black civil rights analogies until white gays fight the stereotype of white/gay 
privilege.192 Gays are largely displayed in popular culture as white and economically privileged, 
and the use of a black civil rights analogy only reinforces this view; this harms the gay rights 
movement overall. She alludes to Hutchinson’s argument in discussing the “intersectionality of 
oppression,”193 and discusses the invisibility of queers of color in the movement. She calls the 
depiction of the gay rights movement in popular culture “wrong” and “fundamentally counter-
productive and undermining to [gay] liberation.”194 She also writes of the need to fight for 
equality for all, “not just for queers, and not just when it comes to the right to marry.”195 
 Another aspect of literature relevant to this issue is Latino Critical theory, which began 
with the purpose of avoiding the “Afro-centrism” of Critical Race Theory, its initial tendency to 
focus on black racial issues instead of issues of other races and other oppressed peoples. Phillips 
discusses the initial reluctance of the Critical Race Theory Workshop to accept principles that the 
fight against the oppression of gays is important, and the “excruciatingly long time [it took] for 
the…Workshop to reflect a strong stance against heterosexism.”196 The seventh point of the 
Workshop’s “Tenets of Critical Race Theory,” first discussed in the second workshop, stated an 
embracement of the “larger project of liberating all oppressed people.”197 The issue for many 
was “whether gay men and lesbians are ‘oppressed people,’ and if so, whether their liberation 
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had anything to do with the fight against racial oppression.”198 It took eight years after the 
second conference when the seventh point was introduced for the Workshop to fully embrace 
principles that the fight against the oppression of gays and lesbians is important and that it should 
be “an integral part of the antiracist struggle.”199 Phillips states that Critical Race Theory 
Workshops now understand that “racism is inextricably linked to oppression on the bases of 
gender and sexuality.”200 
 An important issue also discussed in Latino Critical Legal Theory is the notion of a 
“black/white” civil rights model, the idea that the United States civil rights model is based 
overwhelmingly on race and thus favors black minorities. Moran discusses how the legacy of a 
“Black-White model” of race relations helps to account for the limited success of Latinos and 
non-blacks as well as other oppressed groups in achieving civil rights.201 The Civil Rights model 
is rooted in the African-American experience as a reaction to the harmful effects of slavery, 
whereas the Latino and non-blacks are considered “white immigrants” who were not subject to 
slavery and thus are ineligible for some of the same civil rights that blacks have achieved. 
“White” immigrants were often expected to assimilate by learning English and adopting 
particular American customs in order to prevent discrimination; “officials doubted that Latinos 
were entitled to civil rights protections because like earlier generations of White immigrants, 
they could achieve inclusion through acculturation and assimilation.”202 Many groups argued that 
“a history of disadvantage and discrimination rendered them sufficiently like Blacks to merit 
special protection”203 under civil rights laws. It is this almost-forced comparison to the black 
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experience of slavery in America to determine if groups are eligible for the civil rights model 
that delays many oppressed groups from achieving civil rights; almost no experience of any 
group in American history is comparable to the experience of slavery. In a way, the level or 
severity of past oppression determines the eligibility of oppressed groups to be considered for 
civil rights protection under the Black-White civil rights model. Moran argues that “Latinos need 
to build coalitions with other civil rights groups to forge effective reforms.”204 She also states 
that “some Latinos have questioned the normative centrality of race under the civil rights model. 
They have insisted on treating race as one of a number of relevant personal characteristics that 
shape opportunity.”205 
A similar discussion of the black/white binary can be found in the writing of Juan Perea, 
who explores several leading works on race to show that the black/white paradigm of race not 
only exists in American legal culture and society, but that it limits racial discourse and operates 
to exclude Latinos/as and other non-black minorities from full membership in society.206 He 
defines the race paradigm as “the conception that race in America consists, either exclusively or 
primarily, of only two constituent racial groups, the white and the black.”207 When race scholars 
speak or write as though the black and white races are the only races that matter for the purposes 
of discussion of racial issues and solutions, they invoke this paradigm into racial discourse. 
Furthermore, when scholars merely acknowledge the existence of other races within a discourse 
that mainly focuses on the white and black races, they also invoke this paradigm because they 
fail to examine the distinct “voices”, “histories”, and “real presence”208 of these other races. By 
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examining these other races, like Latinos/as, Asian-Americans, Native Americans, and others 
through an analogy to the black and white races or “real” races, argues, Perea argues, scholars 
restate the black/white paradigm of race. 
Victor Romero also explores the interconnections between race and sexual orientation in 
the context of binational same-sex marriages and the United States Supreme Court.209 He finds 
that although there are many similarities between the Lovings and same-sex couples today and 
progress has been made in the form of Romer v. Evans and Lawrence v. Texas, a more recent 
Supreme Court decision, Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights,210 may have 
less positive consequences for the gay rights and same-sex marriage movements. This recent 
case, he argues, “should give gay rights advocates pause, suggesting that race and sexual 
orientation may be doomed to follow separate, and hardly ever analogous, paths.”211 
The overall position of Latino Critical Legal theory appears supportive of using race and 
sexual orientation together to fight discrimination and to advance civil rights if the black/white 
binary can be bypassed. The arguments show numerous interconnections between various 
oppressed identities and that by working together, these different oppressed groups could more 
easily achieve civil rights for all. The difficulty, of course, is getting past this Black/White model 
of civil rights discourse that currently restricts the ability of non-black and non-racial minorities 
in achieving civil rights. 
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Schacter advances the scholarship on the black/white paradigm by fully extending it into 
the gay rights debates.212 She argues that because the “African American experience…represents 
the paradigm for thinking about American civil rights law,”213 what Schacter calls the “Discourse 
of Equivalents” is used by opponents of gay rights to force a comparison of the experience of 
gays and lesbians with the experience of African Americans in order to legitimize civil rights for 
gays. Schacter argues that the Discourse of Equivalents invokes two main themes: the gay and 
lesbian experience as insufficiently like the experience of already-protected groups like racial 
minorities, women, and religious groups; and sexual orientation as an aspect of identity is 
insufficiently like other already-protected aspects of identity like race, gender, religion, and 
national origin. Both themes form the argument by gay rights opponents that because of the 
differences between gays and blacks in their historical experience of oppression and their type of 
identity, gays and lesbians do not qualify for the protection of civil rights laws. 
Schacter argues that our civil rights discourse should not be based on sameness. In other 
words, in order to be eligible for civil rights, a particular group’s experience should not need to 
be the same or even similar to another group’s experience. In doing so, says Schacter, we enter 
into an “oppression contest,” which leads us to accept “the idea that there is only so much 
freedom to go around and that socially oppressed groups must fight over these putative 
spoils.”214 Schacter devises a more appropriate test of the legitimacy of a particular group’s civil 
rights claim. To determine if the extent to which a group has been oppressed merits civil rights 
protection, we must first look to the specific experiences of gays and lesbians, and then consider 
whether “social subordination and stigmatization subject gay men and lesbians…to systematic 
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exclusion and disadvantage at the hands of dominant groups.”215 Schacter describes this test as a 
higher level of generality than a mere comparison of historical levels of oppression. 
Hutchinson discusses the multidimensionality of oppression and argues for more 
discussion of race within the dialogue of gay and lesbian legal theory.216 “Racial, class, and 
sexual subordination are interrelated” he writes. But responses to sexual subordination tend to 
focus on gays and lesbians of privileged race and class (white and well-off as opposed to non-
white and poor), and “consequently, gay and lesbian legal theory and political discourse fail to 
reflect the complexity of gay and lesbian experiences and exclude people of color and the poor 
from equality debates.”217 Hutchinson also argues that analogies between racial minorities and 
gays and their struggles to achieve civil rights portrays racial minorities and gays as two separate 
groups, while ignoring and making invisible those who do not fit into either group, such 
individuals who are black and gay. This analogy, he argues, masks the importance of the 
multidimensionality of oppression. 
Hutchinson shows that for gays, even trying to win the “oppression contest” is futile, and 
that they should steer away from this discourse. He cites Andrew Sullivan, who argues that the 
intensity of oppression against gays and lesbians is actually more severe than slavery because, 
although gays and lesbians have never been enslaved, slaves “were occasionally allowed the 
right to marry…[but] because [homosexuals] haven’t even been deemed eligible for the 
institution of marriage in the first place[,] they have always been, from one particular 
perspective, beneath slaves. And they still are.”218 This argument, Hutchinson writes, “distorts” 
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the brutality of slavery, and ignores the severely limited rights of slave marriages. And by 
comparing gay and lesbian oppression to slavery and asserting that it is more severe, Sullivan 
only reinforces slavery as the most severe form of oppression and reinforces blacks as most 
deserving of civil rights protection. Hutchinson attempts to advance a new discourse for gay and 
lesbian civil rights claims:  
Gay and lesbian legal theorists and political activists should advocate sexual equality by addressing the 
many harms sexual subordination causes. These harms require legal and political remedies for their own 
sake—without reference to the rights and injuries of black heterosexuals…Multidimensionality provides a 
more effective framework for discussing these harms…[It] portrays these harms without diminishing—but 
rather, acknowledging and emphasizing—the importance of race and other sources of empowerment and 
disempowerment.219 
 
This new discourse asserts that gay and lesbian civil rights activists should refrain from 
comparing their civil rights experience with that of blacks; instead, they must focus on the many 
individual harms that are specific to gays and lesbians. An inclusion of specific racial 
discrimination suffered by gay racial minorities will help to advance this discourse without 
forcing a comparison. We will gain a greater understanding of how racism affects gays and 
lesbians and how heterosexism affects gays and lesbians, and we avoid the harms imposed by 
comparing forms of oppression between varying minority groups. After an examination of the 
plaintiffs’ briefs in Goodridge and Kerrigan, I will show how Hutchinson’s new discourse of 
civil rights fits well with Schacter’s new legitimacy test for gay and lesbian civil rights, and that 
the evolution of race-based arguments as applied to same-sex marriage from the Goodridge brief 
to the Kerrigan brief nicely reflects both Hutchinson’s and Schacter’s arguments. 
  
D. The Importance of Case Briefs 
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The existing scholarly literature on this topic provides little examination of the Loving 
analogy as a strategy of lawyers in modern same-sex marriage cases, and no examination of 
briefs submitted in these cases. A look at these briefs would show how LGBT activists have used 
the racial interpretation of the Equal Protection and Due Processes clauses in Loving as a strategy 
in same-sex marriage cases, and that is how I intend to contribute to the scholarly literature. By 
looking at the relationship between race and sexual orientation through the lens of case briefs 
and state court opinions dealing with same-sex marriage, we would achieve a greater 
understanding of whether the use of Loving as a strategy in same-sex marriage cases is wise and 
beneficial. 
But why examine case briefs? If the existing scholarship failed to look at briefs on this 
particular topic, does that not suggest that briefs are trivial and that nothing of significant value 
can be gained from them? To the contrary, rather; briefs are an extremely important element of 
court proceedings, and an examination of briefs provides perhaps the best picture of how 
activists employ certain arguments in litigation. I believe that the existing scholarship has erred 
in its failure to study briefs in same-sex marriage litigation. 
 Professor Laura Hatcher has argued that amicus briefs have played important roles in 
various court cases. Her discussion is reflective of the role of briefs in the litigation strategy of 
the Gay and Lesbian Advocates and Defenders (GLAD), a non-profit legal advocacy 
organization, in same-sex marriage cases.220 She discusses the emergence of several nonprofit 
law firms devoted to conservative causes, including the Pacific Legal Foundation (PLF), and 
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notes that the amicus brief is its “primary litigation strategy.”221 Additionally, the PLF “claims its 
work has impacted many areas of law…[and its] litigation activity has expanded well beyond its 
initial narrow scope.”222 There are now many conservative legal interest groups223 that sumbit 
amicus briefs in cases around the country as the primary litigation strategy to advance their 
causes. Hatcher also writes of the importance of examining briefs, because “amicus briefs as well 
as case law have provided insights into the workings of property rights advocacy and changes 
occurring in U.S. constitutional law.”224 
 And the importance of the appellant briefs in various types of litigation has been 
expressed by many, including Carol C. Berry, Judge Herbert C. Goodrich, and Supreme Court 
Justice Thurgood Marshall. The importance of appellant briefs is relevant to my thesis because I 
will look at GLAD’s appellant briefs in two state supreme court cases. Berry describes the brief 
as “the most important component of a successful appeal. It gives the judges the first and, many 
times, the last impression of the merits of the case.”225 Berry argues that the brief has grown 
more significant throughout the years because of the changing nature of our legal system. Oral 
arguments are now much shorter than they were in the past, and many circuit courts now only 
hear oral arguments in exceptional In fact, “[the brief] may be the only vehicle by which the 
advocate presents his or her argument.”226 The quality of the brief also often determines whether 
oral argument is justified and will be allowed. 
 Judge Herbert C. Goodrich views the importance of briefs similarly: 
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It is hard to overstate the importance of the brief on an appeal. Oral argument will be discussed later. It is 
important too. But it is made only once in nearly all instances and it is inevitable that some of its effect will 
be lost in the interval between the time the argument is made and the court opinion appears. But the brief 
speaks from the time it is filed and continues through oral argument, conference, and opinion writing. 
Sometimes a brief will be read and reread, no one knows how many times except the judge and his law 
clerk.227 
 
Judge Goodrich here alluded to the often long interval between oral arguments and the writing 
and release of the opinion, which Supreme Court Justice Thurgood Marshall noted directly: 
Regardless of the panel you get, the questions you get, or the answers you give, I maintain it is the brief 
that does the final job, if for no other reason than that the opinions are often written several weeks and 
sometimes months after the argument. The arguments, great as they may have been are forgotten. In the 
seclusion of his chambers the judge has only his briefs and the law books. At that time your brief is your 
only spokesman.228 
 
Considering prominent judges like Judge Goodrich and Justice Marshall view the brief as the 
most important instrument for advocates in appeals, it is strange that scholars have neglected the 
brief in the literature dealing with race and same-sex marriage litigation. By exploring racial 
arguments as used in briefs as the central element of this project, I believe am contributing to, 




I argue that although cases like Loving or Perez may be an appropriate legal model for 
same-sex marriage litigation, a racial interpretation of due process and equal protection is not the 
best strategy for such litigation because it actually imposes certain limits on the same-sex 
marriage movement. To explore this argument, I will examine the appellant briefs submitted 
with two recent state court opinions by GLAD, Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, and 
Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health. I have chosen to look at these two cases because 
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they are two of only three states where same-sex marriage is currently legal as a result of state 
court decisions, and time constraints and the scope of this project prevented an examination of all 
three. Goodridge was decided in 2003, Kerrigan was decided in 2008, and Varnum v. Brien was 
decided in 2009. I felt the two older cases would represent the most original uses of a racial 
approach to same-sex marriage, as it is possible that Varnum, with two recent state court 
opinions as precedent, borrowed heavily from the arguments used in Goodridge and Kerrigan. 
More time certainly would have allowed me to look at Varnum as well, and I certainly suggest 
that any scholar looking to expand upon my work take a look at Varnum as it would definitely 
add to our understanding of the evolution of this racial interpretation in same-sex marriage cases. 
In looking at Goodridge and Kerrigan, I will first introduce the case and set the context 
by explaining the facts of the case. I will then look at each way a racial interpretation of due 
process and equal protection has been used by GLAD through three different aspects of the brief: 
the due process claims, the equal protection claims, and the treatment of the definitional 
argument against same-sex marriage. I will note each way the plaintiffs use a racial argument, 
and highlight those arguments I think are most important and most demonstrative of the 
problems of using a racial interpretation of due process and equal protection as applied to same-
sex marriage litigation. In Goodridge, I highlight four specific racial arguments in the brief that 
demonstrate the limits of a racial interpretation of due process and equal protection as applied to 
same-sex marriage litigation. In Kerrigan, I highlight six racial arguments that demonstrate these 
limits. In the concluding chapter, I compare my findings in both briefs to show an evolution of 
the use of these racial arguments from Goodridge to Kerrigan. I find that the racial arguments in 
both briefs show that by moving away from race, same-sex marriage advocates can bypass the 
dangers and limitations imposed by the black/white binary more easily and make a stronger 
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argument for same-sex marriage. While certain racial arguments in both briefs could be 
improved, including the treatment of the definitional argument by employing the scholarship of 
Professor Eskridge, certain arguments demonstrate that GLAD may have learned to move away 
from race in the time between the two cases. Notably, the different treatment given to the history 




III. THE MASSACHUSETTS CASE: GOODRIDGE V. DEPARTMENT OF 
PUBLIC HEALTH (2003) 
 
We declare that barring an individual from the protections, benefits, and obligations of civil marriage solely 




Goodridge v. Department of Public Health (2003) provides the first example of this 
project. An examination of the Brief of the Plaintiffs-Appellants reveals how the plaintiffs used a 
racial interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses 
in this case. The plaintiffs’ use of race throughout the brief shows that although the racial 
interpretation may provide a logical legal model for same-sex marriage claims, certain aspects of 
that racial interpretation impose limits on same-sex marriage litigation. The plaintiffs’ use of race 
throughout the brief also reflects various same-sex marriage scholarship discussed in chapter II. 
The plaintiffs employed a racial interpretation of equal protection and due process 
arguments and rely on Loving v. Virginia heavily in the brief. In arguing that same-sex couples 
should be allowed to marry and that a prohibition on same-sex marriage violates both individual 
liberty interests and equality interests, the plaintiffs used Loving to argue that marriage is a 
fundamental right for all people, and that it applies to same-sex couples just as it does to mixed-
race couples. Loving was also used to support the Equal Protection argument. Just as prohibitions 
on mixed-race marriage were found to be an unconstitutional racial discrimination because they 
violated Equal Protection guarantees, the plaintiffs argued, prohibitions on same-sex marriage 
should be ruled unconstitutional based on equal protection grounds because they constituted sex 
or sexual orientation discrimination. Calling the “analogy to Perez and Loving…logically and 
analytically irrefutable,” the plaintiffs attempted to show that the mode of analysis relied upon in 
Loving was the same mode of analysis present in Goodridge. Although much of the plaintiffs’ 
                                                 




racial interpretation of the Equal Protection and Due Process clauses as applied to the same-sex 
marriage debates was indeed logical and legitimate, I find four major aspects of the brief that 
suggest that a racial interpretation of due process and equal protection is not the best strategy and 
that, in fact, same-sex marriage advocates should avoid race as much as possible. The first 
important aspect of the brief that I highlight shows the plaintiffs avoiding the issue of race, and 
reflects the third major perspective of the scholarly literature discussed in chapter II. This 
perspective, again, consists of Critical Race theorists, Latino Critical Legal theorists, and Queer 
theorists who have found limitations imposed on the same-sex marriage and gay rights 
movements by the use of a racial interpretation of due process and equal protection to advance 
same-sex marriage. Meanwhile, the other three major aspects I highlight show that the plaintiffs 
still need to take caution in how they approach a racial interpretation to same-sex marriage to 
avoid the problematic impacts of the black/white binary. These three aspects reflect a different 
perspective of the scholarship discussed in chapter II, the argument that a racial interpretation of 
due process and equal protection is a legitimate and logical legal model for same-sex marriage 
litigation, and should be used as part of an argument to advance same-sex marriage. Overall, I 
find that the Goodridge brief represents the view in the literature that a racial interpretation 
should be used to advance same-sex marriage; most of the racial elements of the brief fail to 
address the limitations imposed by applying these racial interpretations to same-sex marriage 
litigation. 
To frame my examination of the racial analysis used in the brief in the context of the 
procedural history and rulings of the case, I first provide a summary of the facts of the case. I 
then explore each way that race is used throughout the brief, and highlight the four most 
significant aspects of the racial interpretation as they arise. I analyze each racial interpretation for 
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its applicability to same-sex marriage litigation, its effectiveness in advancing pro-same-sex 
marriage legalization arguments, and its treatment by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 
in the opinion. I have organized my approach to focus on three main aspects of the brief: the Due 
Process claims, the Equal Protection claims, and claims against the traditional definition of 
marriage argument. 
 
A. Facts of the Case 
Seven couples sought to obtain marriage licenses from a city or town clerk’s office in the 
state of Massachusetts in March or April of 2001. Each couple’s application for a marriage 
license was rejected because each couple consisted of two people of the same sex, and 
Massachusetts did not recognize same-sex marriage.  
On April 11, 2001, the seven couples, represented by the Gay and Lesbians Advocates 
and Defenders (GLAD) filed suit in Superior Court, seeking a judgment that the state’s practice 
of denying marriage licenses to same-sex couples violated several articles, including the liberty, 
freedom, equality, and due process provisions of the Massachusetts constitution. The defendant, 
the Massachusetts Department of Public Health, represented by the Attorney General, admitted 
its practice of denying marriage licenses to same-sex couples, but argued that this practice did 
not violate any Massachusetts law and that the plaintiffs were not entitled to any relief. A 
Superior Court judge ruled in favor of the state, finding that the plain wording of the text of the 
Massachusetts constitution could not be construed as recognizing same-sex marriage, that the 
state’s practice of denying marriage licenses to same-sex couples did not violate the liberty, 
freedom, equality, or due process provisions of the Massachusetts constitution, that the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights did not guarantee a fundamental right to marry a person of 
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the same sex, and that the state’s prohibition of same-sex marriage rationally furthered the state’s 
legitimate interest in safeguarding procreation.   
The plaintiffs appealed the ruling of the Superior Court, and the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court granted direct appellate review. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, 
declaring that the state may not “deny the protections, benefits, and obligations conferred by civil 
marriage to two individuals of the same sex who wish to marry”230 and that the state had “failed 
to identify any constitutionally adequate reason for denying civil marriage to same-sex 
couples.”231 The Court held that the state did not have a rational basis to deny marriage licenses 
to same-sex couples on the grounds of equal protection and due process. 
 
B. A Racial Analysis 
What follows is an analysis of the racial arguments used in the brief. I have organized 
this analysis into three sections: due process, equal protection, and the definitional argument. 
Within each section, I analysis the use of racial precedent and analogies in the context of the 
broader constitutional or definitional claim.  
 
i. Fundamental Right 
 The plaintiffs, represented on the brief by GLAD, argued that there was a fundamental 
right to marriage enshrined in the constitution, and that the “Application of the Marriage Laws 
by the Defendants Directly and Substantially Burdens the Plaintiffs’ Rights to Marry.”232 GLAD 
argued that alleged state interests in biological procreation, childbearing, and the conservation of 
resources carried no weight here, that the needs of gays for self-determination and family privacy 
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were the same as non-gays, and that “doomsday speculation” about polygamy was unfounded. In 
using Loving, GLAD wrote that “It is beyond question that the right to marry is fundamental, and 
within the rights of liberty and privacy, and as such, may not be abridged by the state without a 
compelling state interest.”233 
GLAD then showed that this fundamental right to marry extended to all, citing Zablocki: 
“Although Loving arose in the context of racial discrimination, prior and subsequent decisions of 
this Court confirm that the right to marry is of fundamental importance for all individuals.”234 
They cited Turner v. Safley,235 in which marriage rights were extended to prisoners, as an 
example. In an attempt to understand the liberty and privacy underpinnings” of Loving and 
Turner, the plaintiffs detailed the history of cases before Loving that placed the right “to marry” 
as a liberty interest “essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.”  These cases, 
including Meyer, Perez, Skinner, and Pierce, established that “‘the right to join in marriage with 
the person of one’s choice’ is at least as protected as the liberty rights to have offspring or send 
one’s child to a particular school.”236 To the plaintiffs, it was 
clear why the California Supreme Court struck its miscegenation law in 1948 under the 14th Amendment 
even though miscegenation laws were commonplace at the time, no court had ever declared a 
miscegenation law unconstitutional, such laws were popular, and Plessy v. Ferguson was still the law of the 
land.237 
 
Because the “Constitution protects against unwarranted state interference with ‘personal 
decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and 
education,’”238 GLAD stated that “the right to marry without the freedom to marry the person of 
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one’s choice is no right at all”239 and that state intrusion into these areas of personal decision 
imposed an “intolerable indignity” on an individual. There are human values at stake in these 
personal decisions that protect the family, argued GLAD, and court opinions showed that we 
cannot restrict these human values to a traditional “nuclear” family.240 
It is here that I would like to highlight my first major finding in GLAD’s application of a 
racial interpretation to same-sex marriage litigation, that GLAD attempted to move away from 
race in its brief. GLAD admitted that “Loving arose in the context of racial discrimination,” and, 
to justify the applicability of a racial discrimination case to a sexual orientation/gender 
discrimination case, argued that “prior and subsequent decisions of this Court confirm that the 
right to marry is of fundamental importance for all individuals.” GLAD cited decisions like 
Zablocki and Turner to show that Loving was still powerful precedent for same-sex marriage 
cases because its relevance to marriage was equal to its relevance to racial discrimination. I find 
that GLAD actually moved away from race in this instance by citing cases like Turner. The fact 
that GLAD admitted Loving was a racial case may not seem a wise argument, given the popular 
argument of same-sex marriage opponents that the traditional definition of marriage is the union 
of a man and a woman. After all, if Loving is more about race than it is about marriage, it is 
easier to argue that it does not apply to same-sex marriage litigation because it recognized the 
right of people to marry another person regardless of race, but did not recognize a change in the 
institution of marriage.241 But by citing additional like Turner to show that this fundamental right 
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to marry extended to prisoners and people other than racial minorities, GLAD attempted to show 
that it is the central holding about marriage in Loving that matters and applies to same-sex 
marriage litigation. Other cases applied the general right to marry on specific disadvantaged 
groups, therefore Loving does apply to same-sex marriage litigation because Loving applied the 
general right to marry to interracial couples. Because GLAD made Loving more about marriage 
than about race, it actually moved away from the issue of race to advance it argument about 
same-sex marriage. 
The Massachusetts Court’s opinion invoked Loving to help establish marriage as a 
fundamental right. “Civil marriage has long been termed a ‘civil right,’” the court wrote, and 
cited from Loving: “The freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital personal 
rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.”242 Here, the Court used Loving 
in the same way as the plaintiffs; it recognized the plaintiffs’ argument in the brief that Loving 
helped to establish marriage as a fundamental right. The court rejected the state’s argument that 
this case dealt with the rights of couples, instead arguing that it dealt with the rights of 
individuals. “The rights implicated in this case are at the core of individual privacy and 
autonomy,”243 the court wrote. Another passage from Loving was cited: “Under our Constitution, 
the freedom to marry or not marry, a person of another race resides with the individual and 
cannot be infringed by the State.”244 
The court also invoked Loving and Perez to reflect upon the long history of anti-
miscegenation laws and to show that the right to marry must include the right to marry someone 
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of one’s choice. The Court then compared the interracial marriage cases with the same-sex 
marriage case: 
In this case, as in Perez and Loving, a statute deprives individuals of access to an institution of fundamental 
legal, personal, and social significance -- the institution of marriage -- because of a single trait: skin color in 
Perez and Loving, sexual orientation here. As it did in Perez and Loving, history must yield to a more fully 
developed understanding of the invidious quality of the discrimination.245 
 
Because “history” yielded to a better understanding of negative qualities of discrimination in 
Perez and Loving regarding interracial marriage, argued the Court, here the opponents of same-
sex marriage must yield to a better understanding of discrimination suffered by same-sex couples 
in their inability to legally marry. The Court also made the point that individuals are deprived of 
a fundamental right because of only one trait in both cases, and that that is a fundamental point 
of comparison between the interracial marriage cases and the same-sex marriage case. Rather 
than follow the plaintiffs’ route in citing several cases that extend that the distinction of marriage 
in Loving as a fundamental right to all people and not just racial minorities, the court focused on 
the individual choice aspect of marriage. For the court, it is the necessity that marriage be an 
individual choice (the right to choose to marry) which justified the applicability of Loving, a 
racial discrimination case, to same-sex marriage litigation. The plaintiffs did use this as an 
important part of their argument, but the court chose to make this central and more important 
than the plaintiffs’ reliance on several other cases to counter the argument that Loving is not 
applicable because it arose in the context of racial discrimination. This is not to say the court 
completely ignored the plaintiffs’ citation of cases like Turner and Zablocki, however. Citing 
United States v. Virginia,246 the Goodridge court called “the history of constitutional law…‘the 
story of the extension of constitutional rights and protections to people once ignored or 
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excluded.’”247 These extensions also applied in the area of civil marriage, the court wrote, and 
were demonstrated by decisions in Turner, Loving, and Perez. The court summarized the many 
changes to marriage over the years: “As a public institution and a right of fundamental 
importance, civil marriage is an evolving paradigm.”248 The court simply chose not to use this 
argument as the main factor in its Due Process argument.  
The Goodridge court discussed the Department of Public Health’s argument that the 
“Loving decision did not profoundly alter the by-then common conception of marriage because it 
was decided at a time when antimiscegenation statutes were in ‘full-scale retreat.’”249 The 
plaintiffs had countered this argument by highlighting the importance of Perez, and noting that it 
was decided “even though miscegenation laws were commonplace at the time, no court had ever 
declared a miscegenation law unconstitutional, such laws were popular, and Plessy v. Ferguson 
was still the law of the land.” The court found that the Department’s argument ignored Perez, a 
successful constitutional challenge to an anti-miscegenation statute decided nineteen years 
earlier, and a precursor to Loving. The court described the racial situation in 1948: “racial 
inequality was rampant and normative, segregation in public and private institutions was 
commonplace, the civil rights movement had not yet been launched, and the ‘separate but equal’ 
doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson was still good law.”250 An anti-miscegenation attitude did not 
deter the Supreme Court of California in Perez from declaring anti-miscegenation laws 
unconstitutional. By distinguishing Perez, the Goodridge court showed here that although Loving 
may have been decided at a time when most anti-miscegenation statues had already been 
repealed, Perez (which accomplished essentially the same thing as Loving but on a smaller scale) 
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was decided when most states did still legally prohibit interracial marriage and when racism and 
segregation were much more common.251 The Department of Public Health tried to make this 
argument to show that Loving was not appropriate precedent for the legalization of same-sex 
marriage, because directly prior to the Massachusetts Supreme Court ruling in Goodridge, no 
state legally allowed same-sex marriage. But a look at Perez shows that that was one of the first 
steps toward Loving, and at the time of Perez miscegenation was widely rejected by most states 
and the general public. 
  A second major finding I make is also a major problem with the racial 
interpretation of Due Process applied to same-sex marriage which GLAD failed to address. A 
common argument made by same-sex marriage opponents is that Loving is not applicable to 
same-sex marriage litigation because while Loving was decided after most states recognized 
interracial marriages, very few states currently recognize (and at the time of Goodridge, no states 
recognized) same-sex marriage.252 GLAD attempted to counter this argument by citing Perez, 
which was decided several years earlier when many states still had prohibitions against 
interracial marriage. GLAD argued that because of the long line of precedent recognizing the 
right to marry a person of one’s choice, it was clear why the Perez court ruled against anti-
miscegenation laws “even though miscegenation laws were commonplace at the time, no court 
had ever declared a miscegenation law unconstitutional, such laws were popular, and Plessy v. 
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Ferguson was still the law of the land.”253 However, there are clear differences between Perez 
and Goodridge to be easily exploited by same-sex marriage opponents. Perez was the first court 
to strike down anti-miscegenation laws, so in that respect it is more applicable to Goodridge than 
is Loving. But when Perez was decided, several states (mostly northern states) legally recognized 
interracial marriage and had already lifted their bans through the legislature. At the time of 
Goodridge, no state recognized same-sex marriage, although the Hawaii state supreme court was 
the only other court to rule bans on same-sex marriage unconstitutional. This difference poses 
two challenges. First, it disputes the notion that the circumstances around Perez were similar to 
the circumstances around Goodridge in that they were (or would be, in the case of Goodridge) 
both the first states to recognize interracial and same-sex marriage, respectively. Second, it gives 
ammunition to opponents of same-sex marriage who argue that marriage for those of the same 
sex should be legalized through legislative, “democratic” means rather than through the courts. If 
many states accomplished the legal recognition of interracial marriage through the legislature, 
then the same can and should apply in the case of same-sex marriage. The court accepted the 
GLAD’s argument, and restated it almost verbatim in its opinion. However, the court also did not 
take into account the major differences between Perez and Goodridge. 
ii. Equal Protection 
 GLAD, in the Goodridge brief, also used a racial interpretation of Equal Protection to 
argue that constitutional equality guarantees are violated by restricting same-sex couples from 
marrying. They used an analogy to Loving and Perez to reject the equal application argument of 
the defendants; the following excerpt from the brief illustrates this argument: 
An examination of Perez v. Sharp and Loving v. Virginia demonstrates that “sex” is the forbidden 
variable by which the defendants administer the marriage laws. The facile defense offered by the 
defendants is that men and women are equally disadvantaged, since neither can marry someone of the same 
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sex, so there is no discrimination here. In both Perez and Loving, the courts rejected the notion that 
miscegenation laws effected no racial discrimination simply because both whites and persons of color were 
equally disabled from marrying each other. Equal application of the law to whites and blacks did not 
eradicate the racial classification at work even though on a group level, there was symmetry in the options 
of white and black persons. 
Critically, rather than comparing the experience of whites and persons of color as groups, the 
courts found that limiting an  individual’s choice of whom he or she could marry based on the individuals’ 
races was racial discrimination forbidden by the 14th Amendment.  
Just as those courts had no problem detecting a racial classification at work, so is there a sex-based 
classification here. The analogy to Perez and Loving is logically and analytically irrefutable.254 
 
Table 1 shows charts used in the brief to justify the analogy described above between the 
interracial marriage cases and the same-sex marriage case. Essentially, the equal protection 
argument presented in GLAD’s brief required us to analyze marriage rights as applied not to 
groups, but to individuals; because Loving viewed these rights as applied to individuals and 
found an unconstitutional discrimination based on race, this brief argued that marriage rights 
should again be analyzed as applied to individuals and that this analysis uncovered an 
unconstitutional discrimination based on sex. 
 GLAD also used a racial interpretation of equal protection to reject the opinion of the 
trial court and the defendants’ argument that the classification at issue here was between couples, 
specifically same-sex and opposite-sex couples, and not between individuals, and therefore 
constitutional. GLAD relied upon McLaughlin v. Florida, in which a criminal statute that 
prohibited unmarried interracial couples from living together or “habitually occupy[ing] the 
same room at night”255 while imposing no penalty for similarly situated same-race couples was 
ruled unconstitutional. GLAD wrote: 
The ability to identify a racial classification when the statute “treats the interracial couple made up of a 
white person and a Negro differently than it does any other couple”, is no different from the ability to 
identify a sex-based classification when a statute is applied to treat a couple made up of a man and a man 
differently from a couple made up of a woman and a man.256 
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GLAD concluded that there was a sex-based classification under Article I of the Massachusetts 
constitution. This reliance upon McLaughlin makes sense, but I think that GLAD should have 
noted additional non-racial cases to support its argument. It is too easy to argue that McLaughlin 
should not apply because it was a racial case that did not even involve marriage. GLAD should 
focus its argument on highlighting unequal treatment as the central issue in McLaughlin and then 
showing how the central principle of unequal treatment applied to interracial couples living 
together. As it did in its due process argument when it cited other cases that first found a general 
right to marry and then applied that general right to many different groups of people and not just 
based on race, GLAD here should note cases that first found a general violation of unequal 
treatment, and then show how that unequal treatment was found to apply to particular groups, 
again, not based solely on race. 
In arguing that sexual orientation was a suspect class under the Massachusetts 
constitution and that therefore sexual orientation-based restrictions were subject to strict scrutiny, 
GLAD used race to show that gays and lesbians shared the same characteristics as other groups 
considered to be suspect classes: “gay people share a history of persecution  comparable to that 
of blacks and women and that [o]utside of racial and religious minorities, ... no group ... has 
suffered such pernicious and sustained hostility.”257 GLAD called the persecution suffered by 
gays and lesbians “comparable” to that suffered by blacks, but also conceded that the persecution 
suffered by gays and lesbians was perhaps not as severe as that suffered by blacks. 
 The historical comparison of oppression between racial minorities and sexual minorities 
is the third aspect of the brief I will highlight. I find this to be the second major, and perhaps the 
most consequential, problem in GLAD’s brief. By bringing up and admitting the difference in 
                                                 




the histories of these two minority groups, GLAD highlighted the debate over the level of 
severity of oppression suffered by various civil rights groups. I find that it is quite difficult to 
argue, which GLAD did not attempt, that the discrimination and oppression suffered by the 
LGBT community or any other group is worse the slavery suffered by blacks. The Black/White 
Binary paradigm of the American Civil Rights movement, as discussed by various scholars,258 
holds that the level of severity of oppression determines the extent to which a particular minority 
or oppressed group is eligible for civil rights. Because blacks suffered most severely, they are 
granted civil rights for which other groups, like Asian-Americans, Latinos, or the LGBT 
community may not be deemed eligible. GLAD argued that the oppression suffered by blacks 
and the LGBT community is “comparable,” contrary to what many same-sex marriage opponents 
argue, and thus concluded that the history of these two groups is not so different that it is 
impossible to compare. But GLAD conceded that oppression suffered by blacks was more 
severe, which, under the Black/White civil rights model, invites a comparison and rebuke that 
therefore gays and lesbians may not be eligible for certain civil rights, like the choice of 
marriage, that racial minorities were deemed eligible for. A stronger argument by GLAD is 
desperately needed. GLAD’s argument here can best be seen in Justice Greavey’s concurring 
opinion, in which he wrote: 
The equal protection infirmity at work here is strikingly similar to (although, perhaps, more subtle than) the 
invidious discrimination perpetuated by Virginia's antimiscegenation laws and unveiled in the decision of 
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Loving v. Virginia, supra…. That our marriage laws, unlike antimiscegenation laws, were not enacted 
purposely to discriminate in no way neutralizes their present discriminatory character.259 
 
However, the majority opinion of the court failed to mention any comparison between the 
distinct histories and levels of oppression suffered by blacks and the LGBT community; this 
could indicate the court believes that either this issue bears no relevance to the case, or so much 
as mentioning it would detract from the argument and keeping silent about it would be best. In 
any case, GLAD should stay away from a historical comparison between racial oppression and 
sexual oppression. 
 
iii. Definitional Argument 
 GLAD again used a racial analysis to counter the definitional argument that marriage 
should not be extended to same-sex marriage because the traditional definition of marriage is a 
union between a man and a woman. A passage from Jones v. Hallahan illustrates the definitional 
argument: “[A]ppellants are prevented from marrying ... by their own incapability of entering 
into a marriage as that term is defined.”260 GLAD again employed the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Loving, this time to argue against the definitional argument. Recent courts like the Warren 
Court in its Loving decision rejected this reasoning as “circular and unpersuasive,” argued 
GLAD, because “it fails to address whether the prohibition itself is discriminatory and 
constitutionally permissible.”261 Loving found this reasoning circular and unpersuasive by 
rejecting the “idea that a marriage between a white person and person of color was not a true 
marriage.”262 
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This use of a racial analysis to counter the definitional argument against same-sex 
marriage appears mostly successful, as the court rejected the reliance on the traditional definition 
of marriage to oppose same-sex marriage. However, the majority opinion by Justice Marshall did 
not fully incorporate the GLAD’s racial analysis of the definitional argument. The court admitted 
that the decision “marks a significant change in the definition of marriage as it has been inherited 
from the common law, and understood by many societies for centuries.”263 But the court did not 
reject this reasoning as circular and unpersuasive. Rather, the court appealed to the possible 
effects of the legalization of same-sex marriage on ‘traditional’ opposite-sex marriage, which, it 
concluded, were not negative. The plaintiffs sought to be married, but they did not seek to 
“undermine the institution of civil marriage.”264 Legalizing same-sex marriage may change the 
traditional definition of marriage, “but it does not disturb the fundamental value of marriage in 
our society.”265 The court did use a racial analogy in its decision, but it was quite different than 
that used in Loving and, subsequently, by GLAD in the brief: “Recognizing the right of an 
individual to marry a person of the same sex will not diminish the validity or dignity of opposite-
sex marriage, any more than recognizing the right of an individual to marry a person of a 
different race devalues the marriage of a person who marries someone of her own race.”266 
GLAD’s argument, which cited Loving’s rejection of the traditional definition argument 
as circular and unpersuasive, was actually better seen in Justice Greaney’s concurring opinion 
than in the majority opinion: 
To define the institution of marriage by the characteristics of those to whom it always has been accessible, 
in order to justify the exclusion of those to whom it never has been accessible, is conclusory and bypasses 
the core question we are asked to decide. This case calls for a higher level of legal analysis. Precisely, the 
case requires that we confront ingrained assumptions with respect to historically accepted roles of men and 
                                                 
263 Goodridge, at 57 
264 Ibid. 
265 Ibid. 
266 Ibid., 58 (Internal citations omitted) 
80 
 
women within the institution of marriage and requires that we reexamine these assumptions… to ensure 
that the governmental conduct challenged here conforms to the supreme charter of our Commonwealth.267 
 
Furthermore, argued Justice Greaney, justification of the prohibition of same-sex marriage 
through this definitional argument and an accusation that the plaintiffs are trying to change the 
institution of marriage “terminates the debate at the outset without any accompanying reasoned 
analysis.”268 It is clear that Justice Greaney’s concurrence more closely parallels the argument in 
Loving than does the majority opinion and GLAD’s argument in the brief. In the same way that 
Loving rejected the definitional argument because it was circular and unpersuasive as applied to 
the interracial marriage debate, here the definitional argument was rejected by GLAD and Justice 
Greaney as circular and unpersuasive as applied to the same-sex marriage debate. 
GLAD’s treatment of the definitional argument is the fourth aspect of the brief I would 
like to highlight, and the third major problem I find with the racial analysis used in the brief. The 
fact that the court used a different approach to reject the definitional argument perhaps illustrated 
its recognition of the problematic aspect of the GLAD’s treatment of this argument. I suggest hat 
GLAD use a different approach, that of Professor Eskridge, who argues that there really is no 
‘traditional’ definition of marriage as a union of a man and a woman. GLAD should have 
detailed the history of marriage as Professor Eskridge does, and showed that marriage has not 
always, in every case and society, been considered an exclusively opposite-sex institution. I do 
not think that this argument should replace the argument GLAD used in the brief. Rather, 
Professor Eskridge’s historical debate should compliment GLAD’s existing argument. An 
explanation of the historical dimensions of marriage throughout world history, by highlighting 
same-sex marriage in other cultures, would illuminate the debate surrounding the definitional 
argument against same-sex marriage. It is possible for the definitional argument to appear as 
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circular and unpersuasive because it is not entirely true, whereas the GLAD merely argued that it 
is circular and unpersuasive because it does not thoroughly engage the issues. By incorporating 
Professor Eskridge’s work into its brief, GLAD could have logically argued that (1) the 
definitional argument against marriage is an invalid argument because it ignores the core debate 
surrounding same-sex marriage and therefore is circular and unpersuasive, and (2) assuming that 
the definitional argument is not circular and unpersuasive and fully examining the argument on 
its content, the argument is wrong because marriage has not always been historically defined as 
the union of a man and a woman. GLAD should complement the Loving approach to the 
definitional argument with a historical exploration of same-sex marriage in other cultures in an 




Although a racial interpretation of the Equal Protection and Due Process clauses does 
make sense as applied to same-sex marriage litigation, there are major problems with this 
interpretation that are made clear in this brief. I have highlighted four examples of this racial 
interpretation in the brief that I think are most important and illustrate the problems of a racial 
interpretation of due process and equal protection as applied to same-sex marriage litigation. 
These examples demonstrate that same-sex marriage advocates would be best served to steer 
clear of race in their arguments. The first example I discussed shows GLAD as wisely avoiding a 
focus on race, while the other three examples are racial interpretations containing problematic 
dimensions that GLAD failed to adequately address. These examples also show that GLAD 
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relied too heavily on a perspective of the scholarly literature that fails to recognize the dangers 
imposed by the black/white binary. 
First, GLAD admitted that Loving arose in the context of racial discrimination, but then 
cited several other cases to show that it applies to same-sex marriage litigation. GLAD cited 
these other cases to reinforce the notion that Loving is more about marriage than race, and thus 
should apply to same-sex marriage. By focusing on Loving as a case about the fundamental right 
to choose to marry rather than a racial case and extending the argument to include non-racial 
cases, GLAD avoided race as much as possible. This first example I highlight here best reflects 
the third perspective in the literature that was discussed in chapter II, including the arguments 
made by Professors Hutchinson, Schacter, Moran, Kendell, and others that same-sex marriage 
advocates should consider strategies other than racial precedents because of the dangers imposed 
by the black/white binary.269 But it is unclear whether GLAD purposely steered away from race 
in this particular instance or that they reacted to this literature, as there was no clear pattern of 
avoiding race in this brief.  
Second, a comparison between the number of states that had legalized interracial 
marriage and the popularity of such marriage at the time of Perez and Loving with the current 
state of same-sex marriage in the United States may not have been the best strategy. Although 
Perez may seem more similar to same-sex marriage cases than Loving, there is still a major 
difference between Perez and same-sex marriage cases; other states had legalized interracial 
marriage when Perez had decided, while no states had legalized same-sex marriage before 
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Goodridge. GLAD would be wise to consider avoiding this particular argument, or at least 
consider a different debate on the relevance of the legal and popular state of interracial marriage 
at the time of Perez and Loving to the legitimacy of a racial interpretation of the Equal Protection 
and Due Process clauses as applied to same-sex marriage litigation. This argument by GLAD 
best reflects arguments by the first perspective presented in the literature review; scholars like 
Trosino also look at the similarities in the circumstances surrounding both interracial marriage 
and same-sex marriage and argue that racial precedent makes sense for same-sex marriage 
litigation because circumstances are so similar.270  
Third, GLAD rejected the definitional argument against same-sex marriage with the 
argument from Loving, that this argument is circular and unpersuasive. This argument could be 
stronger, and I suggest that GLAD compliment this with a discussion of the historical importance 
of same-sex marriage in different cultures. I recommend that GLAD use to use Professor 
Eskridge’s scholarship, which moves away from racial precedent by taking a historical approach 
of same-sex unions throughout world history. 
Fourth, GLAD compared the historical oppression of blacks and women to the LGBT 
community and admitted that LGBT oppression is not as severe as was black oppression. This 
comparison was not a wise aspect of the argument, as it reinforced the idea of the black/white 
model of civil rights discourse and may harm the gay rights movement. GLAD should reconsider 
and refine their approach to the differing levels of severity in the oppression suffered by blacks 
and members of the LGBT community so that this difference does not inflame the black/white 
binary. I recommend that GLAD use the work of Professors Hutchinson and Schacter, who have 
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argued for an approach to same-sex marriage litigation that does not force a comparison of 
LGBT and African-American oppression.271  
Overall, GLAD’s racial interpretation of due process and equal protection employed in 
this brief to advance same-sex marriage litigation relied too heavily on scholarship that fails to 
recognize the dangers imposed by the black/white binary. As a result, GLAD failed to address 
these dangers in most of its racial arguments. I find that GLAD should look toward the 
scholarship of Critical Race, Latino Critical, and Queer theorists who recognize and concoct 
solutions to the dangers imposed by the black/white binary. 
We continue our examination of the use of a racial interpretation of due process and 
equal protection as applied to same-sex marriage litigation by moving onto our second example, 
Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health, in chapter IV. 
 
  
                                                 
271 See Hutchinson, Darren Leonard. "Out Yet Unseen: A Racial Critique of Gay and Lesbian Legal Theory and 
Political Discourse." Connecticut Law Review 29, Winter 1997: 561.; Schacter, Jane S. "The Gay Civil Rights 
Debate in the States: Decoding the Discourse of Equivalents." Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review 29 




IV. THE CONNECTICUT CASE: KERRIGAN V. COMMISSIONER OF PUBLIC HEALTH 
(2008) 
 
It is instructive to recall in this regard that the traditional, well-established legal rules and practices of our not-so-
distant past…barred interracial marriage…Like these once prevalent views, our conventional understanding of 
marriage must yield to a more contemporary appreciation of the rights entitled to constitutional protection. 
Interpreting our state constitutional provisions in accordance with firmly established equal protection principles 
leads inevitably to the conclusion that gay persons are entitled to marry the otherwise qualified same sex partner of 
their choice. To decide otherwise would require us to apply one set of constitutional principles to gay persons and 
another to all others. The guarantee of equal protection under the law, and our obligation to uphold that command, 
forbids us from doing so. In accordance with these state constitutional requirements, same sex couples cannot be 




Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health (2008) provides a second example. The 
plaintiffs’ brief in this case shows how the plaintiffs employed a racial interpretation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection and Due Process clauses and applied it to same-sex 
marriage litigation. The plaintiffs’ use of race throughout the brief shows that although the racial 
interpretation provides a logical legal model for same-sex marriage claims, certain aspects of that 
racial interpretation may impose limits on same-sex marriage litigation. In order to frame my 
examination of the racial analysis used in the brief in the context of the procedural history and 
rulings of the case, I provide a summary of the facts of the case. I then explore each way that 
race is used throughout the brief while highlighting six uses I find most significant, and analyze 
each racial interpretation for its applicability to same-sex marriage litigation, its effectiveness in 
advancing pro-same-sex marriage legalization arguments, and its treatment by the Connecticut 
Supreme Court in the opinion. As in chapter III, I have organized my approach to focus on three 
main aspects of the brief: the Due Process claims, the Equal Protection claims, and claims 
against the traditional definition of marriage argument. 
Although the plaintiffs used a racial interpretation of the equal protection and due process 
clauses, including arguments in Loving and Perez, effectively to show that interracial marriage 
                                                 




may act as an appropriate legal model for same-sex marriage litigation, I find six examples of 
problematic aspects of the application of this racial interpretation to the same-sex marriage 
debate. It is these problematic aspects of the racial connection to same-sex marriage which allow 
me to conclude that a racial interpretation of the Fourteenth amendment may not be the best 
approach to same-sex marriage litigation. The plaintiffs failed to address two of the six 
problematic racial arguments used in the brief. However, I find that the other four examples 
actually represent a wise use of race by the plaintiffs; interestingly enough, these approaches 
actually signal a shift away from race as the more effective approach in same-sex marriage 
litigation. 
Unlike the Goodridge brief, GLAD’s racial interpretation of due process and equal 
protection in Kerrigan brief best reflects the scholarship of Critical Race, Latino Critical, and 
Queer theorists who recognize and devise solutions to the dangers imposed by the black/white 
binary on same-sex marriage litigation. Although two of the examples I highlight show a reliance 
on scholarship that does not recognize these dangers, the other four examples demonstrate a 
move away from race and a reflection of literature that does recognize the dangers, like the work 
of Hutchinson and Schacter.273 After examining the briefs in both Goodridge and Kerrigan, I 
find an evolution from one perspective of the scholarship to another; although we cannot be 
certain that GLAD consciously made a decision to move away from race based on the 
scholarship of Hutchinson and Schacter, there is a clear reflection of this scholarship in four of 
the examples I highlight in Kerrigan brief. I agree with GLAD’s move away from race in this 
brief; I think that the arguments by Hutchinson and Schacter that recognize and attempt to create 
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a way around the dangers inherent in the black/white binary represent the most logical criticism 
and solution to the problems resulting from using a racial interpretation of due process and equal 
protection to advance same-sex marriage litigation. 
 
A. Facts of the Case 
 
Eight couples sought to obtain marriage licenses in the town of Madison, CT. Dorothy 
Bean, the Deputy Town Clerk for the town of Madison, denied them marriage licenses because 
each couple was of the same sex. The eight couples, represented on the brief by Gay and Lesbian 
Advocates and Defenders (GLAD), commenced action against the defendants, Dorothy Bean in 
her official capacity as Deputy and Acting Town Clerk of the town of Madison, and J. Robert 
Galvin in his official capacity as the Commissioner of the Connecticut Department of Public 
Health. The plaintiffs sought a judgment declaring that the state’s prohibition of marriage for 
same-sex couples violated due process and equal protection provisions of the Connecticut 
constitution. The plaintiffs did not make any claims under the U.S. Constitution. The plaintiffs 
also sought an order directing Bean to issue marriage licenses to each couple and the Department 
of Public Health to register the marriages once they were performed. 
While the plaintiffs’ action was pending in the trial court, the Connecticut Legislature 
passed a law establishing civil unions for same-sex couples, which conferred on same-sex 
couples in a civil union the same rights as married couples. The parties in this case then 
narrowed the issue to whether the civil union law and its prohibition of same-sex marriage 
passed muster under the state constitution. The trial court ruled in favor of the defendant state, 
finding that the civil union law rendered a traditional constitutional analysis unnecessary because 
the plaintiffs could no longer argue that the state’s laws treated same-sex couples differently than 
opposite-sex couples. Furthermore, the trial court ruled that the establishment of civil unions did 
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not create a “lesser status” for same-sex couples. The plaintiffs appealed to the Connecticut 
Supreme Court, which reversed the judgment of the trial court and ruled in favor of the plaintiffs. 
The Court found that the “trial court improperly determined that the distinction between civil 
unions and marriage is constitutionally insignificant merely because a same sex couple who 
enters into a civil union enjoys the same legal rights as an opposite sex couple who enters into a 
marriage,”274 and that Connecticut’s “statutory scheme governing marriage impermissibly 
discriminates against gay persons on the basis of their sexual orientation.”275  
 
B. A Racial Analysis of the Case Brief 
What follows is an analysis of the racial arguments used in the brief. As in chapter III, I have 
organized this analysis into three sections: due process, equal protection, and the definitional 
argument. Within each section, I analysis the use of racial precedent and analogies in the context 
of the broader constitutional or definitional claim.  
i. Due Process 
Gay and Lesbian Advocates and Defenders, representing the plaintiffs in Kerrigan v. 
Commissioner of Public Health, used a racial interpretation of due process doctrine in the 
Kerrigan case brief to support their due process argument for same-sex marriage. GLAD cited 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion from Loving to establish marriage as a civil right, and in 
criticizing the trial court’s opinion, wrote that “More importantly, the trial court viewed marriage 
as merely a word and ignored its multidimensional significance as an institution with profound 
social and cultural importance and deep personal meaning, and to which access is considered a 
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civil right.”276 In citing Loving to establish the institution of marriage as a recognized civil right, 
GLAD used legitimate precedent and a landmark court decision to frame the argument around 
marriage; they did not note the racial aspect of Loving in this particular argument. 
 However, GLAD then expanded their Due Process argument. As they did in the 
Goodridge brief, GLAD cited other cases in addition to Loving to help frame the debate around 
marriage. By citing Zablocki and Turner, GLAD hoped to show that “[a]lthough Loving arose in 
the context of racial discrimination, prior and subsequent decisions of this Court affirm that the 
right to marry is of fundamental importance for all individuals”277 and that the “liberty interest 
underlying the right to marry is enjoyed by all citizens; this case challenges the deprivation to 
gay people of a fundamental right enjoyed by all Americans.”278 Although GLAD cited a 
passage from Zablocki admitting that Loving arose in the context of racial discrimination, I find 
that the next portion of their argument was specifically framed to reject assertions that cases like 
Loving do not apply to same-sex marriage litigation because race was more central to the case 
than was marriage. For instance, GLAD wrote the following:  
Indeed, in Loving, the U.S. Supreme Court did not determine whether there was a fundamental, historic 
right to “miscegenic,” or mixed-race marriages. The Court in Zablocki did not ask whether there was a 
fundamental right for the poor to marry, nor did the Turner Court assess whether there was a fundamental 
right to “inmate marriage.” In these cases, only after acknowledging the well-established and general 
fundamental right to marry did the Supreme Court consider the application of the right in the context of the 
state’s denial of marriage to a particular class of people.279 
 
GLAD went through case by case to show that in each case, the fundamental, historic, and more 
general right to marry was more important to the Court than was the application of that general 
right to marry to a particular class of people or minority group. In Loving, the Court first 
established the general right to marry, and then conferred that general right to mixed-race 
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couples. In Zablocki, the Court first cited the recognized general right to marry, and found that it 
applied regardless of whether a person had child support obligations. In Turner, the Court again 
first cited the general right to marry, and then ruled that this general right to marry applied to 
prisoners. GLAD’s logic follows that the general right to marry should apply to same-sex 
couples because the general right to marry has been found to apply to these other groups 
regardless of their different situations or characteristics from typical married couples. There may 
not be a fundamental right to same-sex marriage, but that is not what GLAD argued; rather, the 
general right to marry as applied in previous court decisions also applies to same-sex couples. 
GLAD’s essential point here appears to be that all of these previous cases apply to same-sex 
marriage litigation because they are all premised on the established general right to marry. Thus, 
Loving and Perez do apply to same-sex marriage litigation because although they arose in the 
context of racial discrimination, they deal with the more important aspect of a general right to 
marry, and then with the less important aspect of applying that general right to a specific group. 
Race is not important, marriage is important. This is the first major aspect of GLAD’s brief in 
Kerrigan that I want to highlight; like in Goodridge, GLAD tried to avoid race in its discussion 
of marriage as a fundamental right. Essentially, Loving acts as better precedent for same-sex 
marriage litigation when race is taken out of the picture, at least as far as the due process 
argument is concerned. And the Connecticut Supreme Court agreed with GLAD’s due process 
argument, writing that “the civil union law entitles same sex couples to all of the same rights as 
married couples except one, that is, the freedom to marry, a right that has long been recognized 
as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men [and 
women] and fundamental to our very existence and survival.”280 
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ii. Equal Protection 
 
GLAD also used a racial interpretation of equal protection doctrine in the Kerrigan case 
brief to support their equal protection argument for same-sex marriage. Kerrigan differs from 
Goodridge in that same-sex civil unions were legal in Connecticut before Kerrigan was decided 
by the Connecticut Supreme Court, while civil unions were not legal in Massachusetts before 
Goodridge was decided. Thus, the Connecticut court was forced to determine whether civil 
unions, which granted the same legal rights of married, opposite-sex couples to same-sex 
couples, except the title “marriage,” satisfied constitutional equal protection guarantees. As such, 
GLAD needed to argue that civil unions did not satisfy the constitutional guarantee of equal 
protection: “This is one of those occasions when the Court must emphasize that equality under 
the Constitution cannot be realized through separation… The trial court improperly concluded 
that the Plaintiffs had sustained no ‘legal harm’ because the difference between ‘marriage’ and 
‘civil union’ is ‘inconsequential’ and equality is not ‘affected by… names.’”281 Thus, GLAD 
argued, “the trial court misapplied the basic tenets of equal protection law.” Additionally, they 
argued, the trial court improperly treated marriage as a mere word, when it is in fact a very 
significant institution in our society. 
GLAD criticized and rejected the trial court’s use of the term “legal harm” to describe 
equal protection standards. They cited Connecticut Supreme Court precedent showing that 
“treatment” is the correct term for equal protection principles: Franklin v. Berger,282 stating that 
equal protection guarantees “the uniform treatment of persons standing in the same relation to 
the governmental action questioned;” and City Recycling, Inc. v. State,283 which requires that we 
examine whether the statute in question “treat[s] persons standing in the same relation to it 
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differently.” GLAD, in arguing that the name of an institution can, in fact, create a 
discriminatory classification, employed a racial interpretation of the Equal Protection clause. 
They wrote: “No court would immunize from constitutional review a law mandating that state-
recognized unions of mixed-race or mixed-religion couples be called ‘civil unions,’ as long as 
those couples were granted the same protections as ‘married’ couples.”284 The Loving decision 
allowed GLAD to use this racial interpretation; because allowing civil unions yet restricting legal 
marriage for interracial couples would create a discriminatory classification based on race, so 
allowing civil unions yet restricting legal marriage for same-sex couples creates a discriminatory 
classification based on gender or sexual orientation. 
The second important aspect of GLAD’s brief in Kerrigan that I want to highlight deals 
with civil unions and Plessy v. Ferguson,285 and was not part of the Goodridge brief. GLAD 
called civil unions a “mark of inferiority”286 for same-sex couples that resulted from the state’s 
action and not merely from the plaintiffs’ subjective feelings, as the state’s defense argued. 
Indeed, GLAD noted that the trial court’s reasoning “conjure[d] up a long-repudiated notion 
from Plessy v. Ferguson.”287 In upholding separate facilities for blacks, the Supreme Court in 
Plessy used the same reasoning:  
We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff’s argument to consist in the assumption that the enforced 
separation of the two races stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority. If this be so, it is not by 
reason of anything found in the act, but solely because the colored race chooses to put that construction 
upon it.288 
 
GLAD used a racial interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment to show that civil unions for 
same-sex couples do not satisfy Equal Protection standards; GLAD’s argument concerning civil 
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unions reflects the scholarly work of Yan and Isaak.289 I find the racial argument as applied in 
this particular case to same-sex marriage to be quite logical. Same-sex couples and the LGBT 
community are separated from opposite-sex couples and the heterosexual community because 
LGBT couples are restricted from the institution of marriage. While civil unions provide 
comparable legal rights to marriage, they lack the historical and cultural significance possessed 
by marriage. As such, civil unions are a second-class institution compared to marriage. This 
separation is similar to the separate facilities provided to whites and blacks at the time of Plessy 
v. Ferguson, and the defendants’ arguments are the same. The Court in Plessy agreed with the 
defendants’ argument that the state, in granting separate facilities based on race, did not place a 
mark of inferiority on blacks. Rather, blacks only felt inferior because it created a mark of 
inferiority and placed it on themselves. 
Although GLAD made a correct and logical point in noting the similarity in argument 
between Plessy and the defendants in Kerrigan, I think they should have gone further. Rather 
than restrict the argument to a racial comparison, GLAD should have reached for additional 
cases based on non-racial minority characteristics as they did at other points in the brief. The 
danger of relying solely on the Court’s reasoning in Plessy to argue that civil unions do not 
satisfy Equal Protection can be seen the in the work of scholars like Coolidge (arguing that racial 
and same-sex marriage cases are fundamentally different)290 and Wagner (arguing that 
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miscegenation laws were mostly viewed as racial laws rather than marriage laws).291 Even 
scholars who use racial cases to find that the term “marriage” must be applied to guarantee equal 
protection for same-sex couples go further than a mere discussion of the similarity of the 
defendants’ arguments in Plessy and same-sex marriage litigation.292 GLAD must take care in 
how they approach a racial interpretation of Equal Protection as applied to same-sex marriage 
litigation. This civil union argument is also limited by the definitional debate; because GLAD 
did not go far enough in rejecting the definitional argument, their racial argument against civil 
unions still falls victim to the argument that racial cases do not apply because marriage is a union 
of a man and a woman. By relying on additional cases that ruled against separate facilities or 
institutions based on gender, prisoner status, etc., I think GLAD’s argument would be stronger 
and less prone to assertions that race does not apply to same-sex marriage litigation. 
GLAD used a racial interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause in a similar fashion in a 
discussion of the level of scrutiny with which to examine this classification. The plaintiffs argued 
that the exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage was subject to strict scrutiny because it 
discriminated on the basis of sex. They also argued that it was subject to strict scrutiny or, at the 
very least, intermediate scrutiny, because it also discriminated on the basis of sexual orientation. 
They wrote that “the state subjects the Plaintiffs to ‘segregation or discrimination’ by denying 
each one the ability to marry his or her chosen spouse because of sex.”293 For example, if a 
woman wanted to marry a woman, the only difference between her choice of spouse and a man 
(whom she would be eligible to marry) is sex. Thus, stated GLAD, 
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It is…undisputed that a man cannot do what a woman can (marry a man) and a woman cannot do what a 
man can (marry a woman). It is “because of” sex that each individual is outside the definition of marriage. 
Individuals are plainly “separated” from equal access to a civil institution because of sex.294 
 
GLAD then used race as a point of comparison. Discrimination based on sex “stands on the same 
footing as” discrimination based on race, they argued. They continued: “Section 20 no more 
permits the denial of marriage based on sex or the separate designation of same-sex relationships 
as civil unions than it permits the denial of marriage based on race or the separate designation of 
mixed-race relationships as civil unions.”295 
 A racial interpretation was again applied to GLAD’s same-sex marriage litigation 
concerning the equal application debate, and this is the third major point I will highlight. GLAD 
cited a great deal of federal and state precedent to support an equal protection claim, that “the 
exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage is an impermissible, sex-based classification.”296 
The precedent from other state courts was cited to show that there is a sex-based classification in 
heterosexual marriage laws. Excerpts from Baehr v. Lewin,297 Baker v. State,298 and Goodridge 
were presented. GLAD addressed the decisions of courts that have found that marriage laws do 
not discriminate based on sex, and state that these decisions were based on the “simplistic 
view…that a legal restriction is not ‘because of’ sex if it applies equally to all persons who wish 
to marry.”299 The equal application argument, as used in cases such Anderson v. King Country,300 
is the view that both sexes are treated identically because neither men nor women may marry a 
person of the same sex. The decisions reached through this argument are “plainly wrong,” argued 
GLAD, “because they disregard U.S. Supreme Court precedent that has forcefully rebuffed this 
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‘equal application’ defense as a justification under the Fourteenth Amendment.”301 GLAD then 
cited several cases dealing with racial discrimination that rejected the equal application 
argument, notably McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964) and Loving v. Virginia. 
McLaughlin essentially rejected the court’s previous ruling in Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583 
(1883), which had upheld a statute prohibiting adultery between mixed-race couples. The court 
ruled in McLaughlin that “Pace represents a limited view of the Equal Protection Clause… 
Judicial inquiry under the Equal Protection Clause…does not end with a showing of equal 
application among the members of the class defined by the legislation.”302 Loving “reject[ed] the 
notion that the mere ‘equal application’ of a statute containing racial classifications is enough to 
remove the classifications from the Fourteenth Amendment’s proscription of invidious racial 
discriminations.”303 Because these cases dealing with racial discrimination rejected equal 
application as an adequate means to justify racial classifications under Equal Protection doctrine, 
GLAD argued, equal application must also be rejected as an adequate means to justify 
classifications based on gender or sexual orientation under Equal Protection doctrine. GLAD’s 
use of a racial interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause to reject equal application was quite 
logical, and was supplemented by a counter argument to the assertion that racial cases are 
inapplicable to same-sex marriage litigation. 
 Indeed, GLAD directly confronted the argument that Loving and McLaughlin are 
“inapplicable because the fourteenth amendment was concerned with race discrimination.” This 
assertion, GLAD argued, was “illogical and misses the point.”304 It stated the following: 
The exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage involves a sex-based classification for the same reason 
that Loving involved a racial classification -- the exclusion ‘violates the central meaning of the Equal 
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Protection clause’ because it ‘proscribes generally accepted conduct if engaged in by members of different 
[sexes].’305 
 
GLAD also directed us to Roberts v. Jaycees,306 which stated that “stigmatizing injury, and the 
denial of equal opportunities that accompanies it, is surely felt as strongly by persons suffering 
discrimination on the basis of their sex as by those treated differently because of their race.” 
And, “state equal protection provisions that prohibit sex-based classifications, such as Section 
20, equally abhor race-based and sex-based classifications.”307 GLAD essentially argued that we 
should ignore the racial component to cases like Loving and McLaughlin, and focus on the fact 
that there is discrimination based on an impermissible classification. Just because Loving and 
McLaughlin were based on racial discrimination does not mean that the central components of 
their decisions should not apply to same-sex marriage litigation. Again, it appears that GLAD 
tried to steer clear of race to maintain the applicability of these racial cases to Kerrigan; a racial 
interpretation of Equal Protection here includes keeping a distance from race as a factor. GLAD 
also, like in the Goodridge case brief, argued that the equal application defense should be 
rejected because constitutional rights are individual, not group rights.  
The fourth aspect of GLAD’s racial argument in the case brief that I want to highlight 
used race in a different way to supplement its equal protection argument. In response to the 
state’s argument that the uniformity of its marriage laws with those of other states is a rational 
basis and therefore serves as a justification for barring legal marriage between same-sex couples, 
GLAD stated that states have always had different rules regarding marriage eligibility with 
respect to various characteristics. GLAD wrote that “historically, states have…had dramatically 
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different laws based on race and ethnicity, remarriage after divorce, and competency.”308 
Therefore, “insisting on uniformity for only one aspect of the State’s marriage eligibility laws is 
irrational.”309 In addition to race, GLAD also mentioned other characteristics including “age, 
consanguinity and physical condition.”310 Again, this mention of other characteristics appears to 
have been an attempt to leave the race-sexual orientation connection out of the picture. By 
grouping race with various other characteristics of minority groups, GLAD fought the notion that 
racial discrimination cases do not apply to same-sex marriage litigation. Yes, Loving and 
McLaughlin were racial discrimination cases, but the central holdings still apply to any 
discrimination case, no matter the characteristic. 
GLAD dedicated a large part of their brief to a discussion of the history of invidious 
discrimination, oppression, and harsh treatment endured by gays and lesbians. Interestingly, 
however, GLAD did not mention the history of oppression suffered by blacks. This is an 
important difference from the Goodridge brief, in which GLAD noted that blacks have suffered 
more severely than gays and lesbians, and is the fifth significant aspect of GLAD’s racial 
argument in Kerrigan that I highlight here. In the Kerrigan case brief, the closest GLAD came to 
a comparison is their very brief citation of Roberts v. Jaycees in a footnote: “stigmatizing injury, 
and the denial of equal opportunities that accompanies it, is surely felt as strongly by persons 
suffering discrimination on the basis of their sex as by those treated differently because of their 
race.”311 But this citation was not part of GLAD’s discussion of LGBT oppression, and deals 
with current oppression anyway. This is another significant move away from race. GLAD noted 
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311 See Kerrigan, Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants, at 30 (citing Roberts v. Jaycees 468 U.S. 609, 625 (1984)). 
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many aspects of the “harsh oppression and systematic discrimination against gay people in our 
law and culture over the last century”312: 
Until 1961, it was a crime in every state for lesbians and gay men to engage in intimacy with loved ones. 
Indeed, it was not uncommon for police to raid gay establishments and arrest people on such charges as 
disorderly conduct merely for congregating and socializing. Until the 1970s, lesbians and gay men were 
widely regarded as mentally ill and sexual and moral perverts. Lesbians and gay men have been subject to 
widespread employment discrimination (including by the federal government) and are among the most 
frequent victims of hate crimes. In spite of progress, significant stigma associated with lesbian and gay 
people remains today.313 
 
This is a long and clear history of oppression detailed by GLAD. Had GLAD supplemented this 
with a discussion of the history of racial discrimination suffered by blacks in the United States, 
including slavery, the oppression suffered by the LGBT community would have paled in 
comparison. I think GLAD realized this, and tried a different approach. In leaving the history of 
black racial discrimination out of the argument, a compelling and disturbing picture of LGBT 
oppression was presented. GLAD wanted to present LGBT oppression as unique and disturbing 
because it has harmed people, not because it was more or less severe than other forms of 
oppression. I think this was a wise approach for GLAD, because it stayed away not only from 
race, but from the dangers imposed by the Black/White Binary. The Connecticut Supreme Court, 
in its decision, agreed with GLAD’s assessment of the historical oppression suffered by LGBT 
individuals: “gay persons…face virulent homophobia that rests on nothing more than feelings of 
revulsion toward gay persons and the intimate sexual conduct with which they are associated.”314 
Although the court did note that racial and religious minorities have suffered more than 
homosexuals, it framed this statement to reflect the severity of LGBT oppression, stating that 
“only racial and religious minorities have suffered more intense and deep-seated than 
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homosexuals” (emphasis added),315 and adding that gays and lesbians face “unique 
challenges”316 to their social integration. 
 
iii. Definitional Argument 
 GLAD confronted the definitional argument against same-sex marriage by appealing to 
the racial interpretation of Equal Protection from Loving. GLAD first criticized the reasoning 
typically employed to advance the definitional argument against same-sex marriage: 
The tautology—that marriage must remain a heterosexual only institution because marriage has been a 
heterosexual institution – vitiates the equality and liberty guarantees and thwarts the process of 
constitutionalism itself. The Connecticut Constitution would be an “atrophied” and “static” document, 
frozen in time, if citizens could be treated unequally solely based on legislators’ personal beliefs about a 
past history of exclusion.317 
 
GLAD’s rejection of the tautology used to promote the definitional argument was simple 
enough; it used the same reasoning as the Loving court did in rejecting the definitional argument 
against interracial marriage. However, GLAD extended the argument by specifically citing 
rejections of this particular tautology by past courts. It noted the finding by the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court in 2003 that “[I]t is circular reasoning, not analysis, to maintain that 
marriage must remain a heterosexual institution because that is what it historically has been.”318 
It also noted the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Lawrence, which stated that “neither history 
nor tradition could save a law prohibiting miscegenation from constitutional attack.”319 
 It is worth noting that in rejecting the definitional argument, GLAD did not rely upon 
Loving directly. Rather, it relied upon other cases that specifically concern LGBT discrimination 
and same-sex marriage that had already used the reasoning in Loving to reject the definitional 
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argument as applied to LGBT rights litigation. Furthermore, GLAD did not limit its discussion of 
past cases rejecting the definitional argument to racial cases. For example, it referred to United 
States v. Virginia,320 to show that the historical exclusion of women from certain professions 
based on stereotypical beliefs represents “impermissible grounds to deny equal opportunity to 
women.”321 It is clear that once again, GLAD sought to steer clear of race. It attempted to 
establish a clear precedent of court opinions that have already used the reasoning in Loving in 
that particular way, and it noted discrimination based on characteristics other than race to show 
that for many types of discrimination, the definitional argument has been rejected. 
 However, like in the Goodridge brief, I find GLAD did not go far enough in rejecting the 
definitional argument against same-sex marriage, and this is the sixth major aspect of the 
GLAD’s racial argument that I highlight. GLAD’s argument attacked the reasoning of the 
definitional argument as flawed and illogical, and noted a judicial precedent that has rejected this 
reasoning in various discrimination cases. However, GLAD’s brief could be stronger if it showed 
that the assertion that marriage is, by definition, a union between a man and a woman, is false. I 
suggest that GLAD explore the historical argument advanced by Professor Eskridge, and note 
that same-sex unions have been an important aspect of many cultures and civilizations in world 
history. A discussion of Professor Eskridge’s argument, coupled with an attack on the logic of 




GLAD used a racial interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process and 
Equal Protection Clauses to advance its same-sex marriage litigation on three grounds: due 
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process, equal protection, and a rejection of the definitional argument against same-sex marriage. 
While GLAD’s racial interpretation as applied to same-sex marriage litigation appears logical 
and effective—and in most cases I agree that a very strong argument is made—there remain 
problems with applying racial issues and cases to same-sex marriage litigation. GLAD’s 
treatment of race as applied to same-sex marriage litigation in the Kerrigan brief shows that 
while racial cases like Loving may serve as a logical legal model for same-sex marriage 
litigation, there are major problems inherent in this argument that forced GLAD to move away 
from race as much as possible. 
The main problem I find with GLAD’s brief is that it did not go far enough in 
confronting the definitional argument against same-sex marriage. GLAD should use Professor 
Eskridge’s historical exploration of same-sex unions in an attempt to prove the definitional claim 
false. Additionally, GLAD’s racial approach toward rejecting civil unions was lacking; a 
discussion of other non-racial cases that have rejected the “separate but equal” doctrine is 
necessary in order to move away from race and assertions that race does not apply to the same-
sex marriage debate. This racial argument is too reflective of scholars like Isaak who employ 
racial precedent to argue that civil unions for same-sex couples do not satisfy an equal protection 
guarantees.322 
Most of the other racial approaches in this brief were stronger, and I agree with these 
other approaches because they appear to have limited the negative impact of the black/white 
binary on the same-sex marriage debate. Interestingly enough, these stronger approaches all aim 
to avoid race to a certain extent. In admitting that Loving arose in the context of racial 
discrimination, GLAD quickly pointed out several other non-racial cases dealing with the 
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fundamental right to marry. This showed that the central holding of Loving applied to the same-
sex marriage debate while essentially leaving race out of the picture. In confronting the argument 
that the equal application debates in Loving and McLaughlin are not applicable to same-sex 
marriage litigation, GLAD emphasized the marriage aspects of these two cases rather than the 
racial aspects. In rejecting the state’s argument that uniformity of marriage is a rational basis, 
GLAD steered away from race by noting several other non-racial examples of how different 
marriage laws have been historically, state by state. And, perhaps most importantly, GLAD did 
not compare LGBT oppression with black racial oppression. This allowed LGBT oppression to 
stand on its own as oppression, regardless of how severe it was compared to other forms of 
oppression against other minority or disadvantaged groups in United States history. This closely 
reflects the scholarship of Hutchinson and Schacter, who argue for a new approach to same-sex 
marriage litigation that does not rely on a comparison between LGBT and black racial 
oppression. This close reflection of Hutchinson and Schacter’s work indicates that GLAD may 
have actually relied on this scholarship in the development of the racial arguments in their 
Kerrigan brief, and that the reflection of the scholarship in this brief may be more than a mere 
coincidence. I believe this also shows an evolution away from race between the Goodridge brief 




V. EVOLUTION FROM GOODRIDGE TO KERRIGAN: THE BLACK/WHITE BINARY, 
CONCLUSIONS, AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
 So what can we make of these findings? What does our examination of two case briefs 
from recent same-sex marriage court opinions reveal about the effectiveness and appropriateness 
of using interracial marriage and a racial interpretation of Due Process and Equal Protection 
doctrine as a model for same-sex marriage litigation? And can our findings from each brief be 
logically integrated to form one thesis? 
 First of all, I have found that same-sex marriage proponents and organizations like 
GLAD are able to make strong, clear, and logical arguments supporting that legalization of 
same-sex marriage based precedent set by interracial marriage cases like Loving v. Virginia. 
There are certainly similarities between the debate over miscegenation in the 1960s and the 
debate over same-sex marriage today, and race was a factor in discrimination, and still is in many 
aspects of our society, just as sexual orientation is certainly a factor in discrimination and has 
been for many years. Many of GLAD’s arguments in both the Goodridge and Kerrigan briefs 
echoed the arguments of the numerous scholars who employ a racial element in support of same-
sex marriage.323 And the fact that a significant majority of scholars who research in this area 
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support the use of a racial interpretation of Due Process and Equal Protection doctrine as an 
appropriate legal model for same-sex marriage litigation suggests that it may actually be quite 
easy to make a strong argument to legalize same-sex marriage based on interracial marriage 
precedent. 
 But using race does impose certain limits on same-sex marriage litigation, and this is 
clear from my examination of the briefs. Looking generally at the cases, the state supreme courts 
of Massachusetts and Connecticut both ruled in favor of the plaintiffs GLAD represented, but we 
must look specifically at the arguments used in the briefs to see the limits imposed. While some 
of GLAD’s arguments openly exposed these limits as major weaknesses, it is clear that in some 
arguments, even though the limits are exposed, GLAD actually worked to prevent the limits by 
moving away from race. Some of these arguments are the same in both cases, while some are 
approached quite differently, and may mark a shift in how race is approached and applied to 
same-sex marriage litigation. I highlight here what I feel are the four most important racial 
arguments made in the briefs. 
 A common argument advanced by anti-same sex marriage scholars like Coolidge and 
Wagner is that Loving arose in the context of racial discrimination and therefore does not apply 
to the same-sex marriage debate because race was more central to Loving than was marriage. In 
the briefs for both Goodridge and Kerrigan, GLAD focused on marriage cases that did not 
involve racial minorities. GLAD moved away from race to show that the central holding about 
marriage in Loving did, in fact, apply to same-sex couples because it applied to everyone. 
 The racial approach taken to reject the definitional argument against same-sex marriage 
was similar in both the Goodridge and Kerrigan briefs, although in both cases GLAD failed to 






go far enough. GLAD rejected the definitional argument as “circular and unpersuasive,” just as 
Loving rejected the definitional argument against interracial marriage. As mentioned earlier, I 
suggest in both briefs that GLAD supplement their attacks on the reasoning of the definitional 
argument with Professor Eskridge’s discussion of the historical significance of same-sex unions. 
This would make GLAD’s argument stronger; in addition to attacking the reasoning, they could 
add that ‘even assuming the argument is logical, it is clearly false because the traditional 
definition of marriage has not always been a union between a man and a woman.’ 
 Several arguments are approached differently in the two briefs; some are present in one 
but not the other. For example, in the Kerrigan brief, GLAD rejected the state of Connecticut’s 
argument that the uniformity of the state’s marriage laws to other states’ marriage laws is a 
rational basis. This was not mentioned by GLAD in the Goodridge brief, probably because 
Massachusetts did not make an argument about the uniformity of its marriage laws with other 
states. In the Kerrigan brief, however, GLAD steered away from race by noting several non-
racial cases, in additional to racial cases, in which marriage laws were shown to have a history of 
being very different from state to state. 
 The most significant shift from the Goodridge brief to the Kerrigan brief centers around 
the historical oppression suffered by both blacks and LGBT individuals; debates about the 
comparison of the severity of oppression suffered by different minority groups have been central 
in the literature on the Black/White Binary and Latino Critical Legal Theory, including work by 
Juan Perea, Rachel Moran, Darren Hutchinson, and Jane Schacter. In the Literature Review, I 
noted that a comparison between the two briefs would reveal an evolution in GLAD’s use of a 
racial interpretation of due process and equal protection that reflects Hutchinson’s and Schacter’s 
arguments. In the Goodridge brief, GLAD discussed the history of LGBT discrimination, and 
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openly compared it to discrimination suffered by other groups, like blacks and women; GLAD 
admitted that LGBT oppression was not as severe as black oppression. I think this was a terrible 
strategy, as an open admittance that black oppression is more severe than LGBT oppression only 
reinforces and furthers ingrains the black/white binary into our civil rights discourse and risks a 
more difficult process of achieving rights for the LGBT community, as a comparison to black 
oppression is then forced to justify one’s eligibility for civil rights. However, in the Kerrigan 
brief, GLAD provided a detailed account of oppression suffered by gays and lesbians, but did not 
include an account of black oppression. There was no admittance that black oppression was more 
severe than LGBT oppression, no comparison to black oppression, not even a mention of black 
oppression or slavery. This was quite a significant shift in approach from the Goodridge brief to 
the Kerrigan brief, and I think it symbolized a growing recognition of the dangers imposed by 
the black/white binary and, more generally, the limits imposed by applying a racial interpretation 
of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses on same-sex marriage litigation. GLAD, in the 
Kerrigan brief, appears to have followed the views of Professor Hutchinson, who wrote that 
Gay and lesbian legal theorists and political activists should advocate sexual equality by addressing the 
many harms sexual subordination causes. These harms require legal and political remedies for their own 
sake—without reference to the rights and injuries of black heterosexuals…Multidimensionality provides a 
more effective framework for discussing these harms…[It] portrays these harms without diminishing—but 
rather, acknowledging and emphasizing—the importance of race and other sources of empowerment and 
disempowerment.324 
 
Hutchinson believes, and I agree, that harms to sexual minorities should stand on their own 
without being compared to more severe racial oppression. And Hutchinson’s new discourse fits 
well with Schacter’s test325 to determine the legitimacy of civil rights claims: “[whether] social 
subordination and stigmatization subject gay men and lesbians…to systematic exclusion and 
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disadvantage at the hands of dominant groups.”326 Hutchinson discusses what we must address in 
our discourse (“the many [specific] harms sexual subordination causes”) in order to subject gay 
and lesbian experiences to this test. Many of the harms specific to gays and lesbian that are 
rooted in sexual subordination, like marriage and parental rights restrictions, housing and 
employment discrimination, and the closet, do clearly represent systematic exclusion and 
disadvantage at the hands of dominant groups. By keeping a comparison to the African-
American civil rights experience out of the picture, we rid ourselves of a racial analogy that 
imposes enormous limits on the ability of gays and lesbians to achieve civil rights appropriate to 
their needs. GLAD in the Kerrigan brief highlighted only gay and lesbian oppression, so that this 
oppression could stand by itself as harmful and deserving of redress and relief without the 
requirement of meeting a certain standard of severity. 
 Because racial precedents impose dangers to the same-sex marriage movement, a case 
like Romer v. Evans also deserves some attention and consideration as a possible alternative 
solution. Romer, as discussed in chapter I, dealt with discrimination against individuals based on 
sexual orientation, and obviously was not a racial case like Loving or Perez. Romer has been 
perceived as a victory for the gay rights movement by many gay rights advocates and scholars. 
But Romer has not been very widely cited beyond Lawrence v. Texas because of its anomalous 
nature. Justice Kennedy, in writing the majority opinion in Romer, treated the Colorado 
Amendment struck down by the Court as a unique law that dehumanized gays and lesbians. In 
doing so, he eliminated the need to look at issues of strict scrutiny and avoided the question of 
whether gays and lesbians are a suspect class.327 Looking at Romer from this perspective, one 
must question the authority of this decision as applied to later same-sex marriage litigation and 
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consider its limited reach and potentiality to extend to other LGBT legal concerns. Nonetheless, I 
feel as though a further and more thorough investigation into the use of Romer in recent same-
sex marriage litigation would present a better understanding of Romer’s role in and implications 
for such litigation. Perhaps there is a way in which Romer could be used more productively and 
effectively than cases like Loving because it avoids the dangers imposed by the black/white 
binary. 
 Although I certainly believe my findings to be accurate and significant, I must confess 
that my research, although thorough and exhausting, is but a small speck within the universe of 
potential future research that could add to and expand upon my own. I hope I have added to the 
existing scholarly literature in a meaningful way by examining appellants’ briefs of same-sex 
marriages cases to explore how LGBT activists have used interracial marriage and race in 
general as an appropriate legal model for same-sex marriage litigation, and whether the use of a 
racial interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses 
as applied to same-sex marriage litigation is a wise strategy. I only regret that the limited scope 
and resources of this project prevented me from pursuing other interesting and potentially 
significant aspects to various civil rights and legal debates that sprang up along the way. For 
example, I became interested by various debates within the LGBT community concerning the 
importance of marriage legalization on the gay rights agenda, as well as certain historical debates 
about marriage. These debates all have many dimensions, and volumes could be added to the 
volumes of literature that already exist. 
I also believe my conclusions could be developed further; for example, further research 
could generate more effective strategies in combating the limits to a racial interpretation I have 
exposed here. I suggest, particularly, a similar examination of the appellant brief submitted by 
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Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund in Varnum v. Brien to see how Lambda Legal 
employed a racial interpretation of due process and equal protection and to what extend it 
considered the limitations of a racial analogy in the brief. It would be interesting to see if 
Lambda Legal continued GLAD’s apparent practice of moving away from race. Or perhaps there 
is a way to use interracial marriage as a precedent for the legalization of same-sex marriage 
without exposing the dangers of the black/white binary? Perhaps someone can develop an 
effective method to fulfill Professor Hutchinson’s desire for more discussion of race within the 
dialogue of gay and lesbian legal theory without portraying blacks and gays as two separate 
groups and without masking the multidimensionality of oppression. Or perhaps the journey that 
should be shared by race and sexual orientation in the arena of marriage rights is condemned to a 
less fortunate fate, as Professor Victor C. Romero suggests: “the hardships faced by gay and 
lesbian couples who want to legitimize their relationships through state-recognized marriage 
mirror the struggles of interracial couples during the heyday of the Civil Rights 
Movement…[but] race and sexual orientation may be doomed to follow separate, and hardly 
ever analogous, paths.”328 
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